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This paper consists of three case studies of the emergence of three successful 
export activities in Mexico: avocado production, the manufacture of catheters, and 
call center outsourcing.  Each case study discusses how companies, associations, 
and governments at various levels have addressed market failures and facilitated 
the provision of public goods necessary for each activity. The case studies 
additionally profile first movers in each activity and describe the positive 
externalities they provide to imitators, particularly diffusion of export knowledge. 
Also included in each case study is a counterfactual case of a less successful 
activity (mango production, stem cell banking, and other types of business 
process outsourcing, respectively) and a section on policy implications. 
 
JEL Classifications: H41, L26, L65, L84, Q13 
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I. Avocados  
 
1)   Introduction 
   
The presence of avocados in the world market has been growing steadily in the past two decades, 
and it is no longer considered an exotic fruit but part of the everyday diet of many countries. This 
trend has been reinforced by the increasing popularity of natural products. Avocado, sold mainly 
as a fresh fruit, is the main ingredient of guacamole, which is used in salads and dips. 
Consumption of avocados is recommended to assist in lowering cholesterol, and processed 
avocado oil is used in the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries. Worldwide, Mexico is the 
largest grower and consumer of avocados, and more recently the largest exporter of avocados. 
According to the 2006 World Trade Atlas, Mexican exports increased from less than a million 
dollars in 1985, to $34.5 million in 1995, and $407.6 million in 2005.  
This study uses two methods to explore how avocados emerged as a new, successful 
export activity in Mexico. It specifies how Mexican companies, local associations, and 
governments dealt with market failures (externalities, coordination failures, and the existence of 
public goods); and compares the case of avocados with a counterfactual case. The study first 
explains the logistics of initial avocado exports, identifying the main problems and uncertainties 
confronting the first exporters, or first movers. Second, the study analyzes the solutions provided 
by the first movers that might have provoked positive externalities (promotion of country brand-
name, identification of transport requirements, and so on), facilitating the entrance or newcomers 
or imitators. The study pays special attention to the diffusion of export know-how to imitators. 
Third, it points out the roles of local associations and governments in dealing with both the 
existence of public goods (setting up a disease-free region) and coordination failures, such as 
noncompliance with certification procedures in the production and export stages.  
Lastly, to emphasize the lessons provided by successful export activities of avocados, the 
study compares the avocado experience with a counterfactual case. As several of the avocado 
producers and exporters had already tried unsuccessfully to export mangoes, this product was 
selected as the opposing scenario. Fieldwork took place mainly in the avocado producing state of 
Michoacán, in central Mexico, between August 2006 and January 2007, and open-ended 
interviews were conducted with local producers, exporters, heads of nongovernmental 
organizations, government officials, and one industry consultant. 
   5
2)  Avocados and the State of Michoacán: A Fresh Marriage 
 
The avocado is a fruit that belongs to the family of Lauraceas and the species Persea gratissima 
or Persea Americana Mill. The oldest evidence of avocados (Persea americana) in Mexico was 
found in a cave located in Coxcatlán, Puebla, Mexico that dated from 10,000 B.C. In colonial 
times, the Spaniards introduced the avocado to the rest of America and to European countries. 
During 1950 to 1970, avocado producers in Mexico began planting diverse avocado varieties, 
such as Fuerte, Bacon, Rincon, Criollo, and Zutano.
2 Perhaps the most important feature of the 
plant is that the fruit does not mature on the tree. Avocados will be ready to be consumed one or 
two weeks after being cut, and they can remain unspoiled on the tree anywhere from four to six 
months. The tree acts as a natural warehouse (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). 
The State of Michoacán offers some comparative advantages for the cultivation of 
avocados, such as climate and soil features that allow the trees to produce all year long. A belt 
across the state possesses the bioclimatic requirements needed for raising avocados. Michoacán’s 
avocado belt (86,000 hectares) is located on a volcanic area, 1,600 meters above sea level, across 
20 municipalities, the largest one being Uruapan, Michoacán. This belt contains volcanic soil, 
which is deep, clay-like earth rich in organic substances, and most importantly rich in iron, 
aluminum, and potassium. The belt also has the correct level of humidity and an adequate 
climate for harvesting avocados.  Avocado production requires a great deal of water. In 
Michoacán, where only about half the orchards have irrigation systems, abundant rainfall gives 
Mexican producers an advantage in lower water costs compared with other countries. In the 
areas visited, the orchards required relatively little maintenance, the fruit withstood neglect, and 
the trees continued to produce. 
Michoacán avocado producers benefited early on from genetically improved varieties, 
which are rich in taste and resistant to disease and extreme weather. In the mid-1950s, a small 
group of entrepreneurs established the first nurseries of improved avocado varieties, including 
                                                 
2 In fact, there are more than 500 varieties of avocados but just a few of them have commercial importance today. 
The variety “Hass” is the most well-known due to its trade qualities; in particular, its ripening point lasts longer 
compared with the other varieties. Avocados have a thick, rough, and bright green peel, varying to dark green, 
almost black depending on the ripening point. The pulp is pale green colored and creamy textured; according to the 
National Institute of Nutrition in Mexico, this product is of high nutritional value, has significant quantities of 
vitamins like A, C, D, E, K, and part of the B complex that turns it into a 100 percent nutritive fruit. Medical 
researchers assert that avocados potentially reduce cholesterol due to the amount of fat they contain, which is 20 to 
30 percent, depending on the degree of ripeness, and mainly because of the unsaturated fats they contain. Experts in 
nutrition and diet claim that the consumption of avocados prevents cardio and circulatory diseases by reducing 
excess fat in the blood.    6
Fuerte, in the town of Uruapan. During this time, Mr. Hass developed a stronger avocado variety 
from Guatemalan trees, whose fruits lasted longer and were more resistant to disease (Vega 
Esquivel, interview, 12/5/06). Hass and Fuerte plants were taken to California, where their cold 
weather resistance increased. In 1957, the Uruapan nursery owners introduced these improved 
varieties to the region of Michoacán and they continue to be improved.  For example, Leopoldo 
Vega, an Uruapan grower, imported 5,000 plants from California and created 25,000 more plants 
(Vega Esquivel, interview, 12/5/06). Michoacán producers then had access to improved avocado 
varieties. Due to the positive reaction of the Hass variety to Michoacán weather, many local 
producers began to move from Fuerte and native varieties to the improved Hass variety. Half a 
million plants were produced and sold in Mexico during this time (Vega Esquivel, interview, 
12/5/06). 
In 1963, the state of Michoacán set up commercial nurseries containing the Hass variety 
with potential production of 18,000 to 20,000 certified plants from Santa Paula, California. By 
1965, the Michoacán State Forest Commission had begun to produce nurseries for fruit trees, 
including the Hass avocado, offering free trees to peasant producers in rural communities 
throughout Michoacán. As a result, the Hass variety became a strong competitor against the 
Fuerte and Criollo varieties for the national market. The genetically improved variety, which was 
resistant to disease and extreme weather, had been developed by Mr. Hass and improved by 
producers in California and Uruapan. From an economic point of view, they had created a public 
good whose benefits spread over the state of Michoacán through the action of private and public 
institutions. 
By the late 1960s, Mexican consumer preferences were shifting slowly toward Hass, 
providing the consumer demand that resulted in a dramatic expansion in Hass avocado orchards 
in Michoacán. The cultivation area increased from 3,700 hectares in 1970 to 80,000 hectares in 
2003. Production increased from 40,000 tons to one million tons in the same period. With this 
planting increase, Mexico became the world’s largest avocado grower and consumer. 
  The avocado boom was known regionally as the time of “green gold,” and had its first 
peak in the mid-1980s.  This situation effected an important change: the producers with larger 
farms gradually replaced coffee, banana, lemon, mango, and guava plantations with avocados. At 
the beginning of the 1980s, new industries developed alongside the cultivation of avocado, such 
as professional pickers, packing plants for fresh avocados, manufacturing of avocado products   7
such guacamole paste and avocado oil, and avocado exporters. Today, avocado production 
represents 62 percent of agricultural production in Michoacán. According to 2003 figures, 
avocado production generates 47,000 direct jobs, 70,000 seasonal jobs, and 187,000 indirect 
permanent jobs.
3 
  As a recap, Michoacán producers enjoyed the following set of preconditions that paved 
the way for the development of the industry: the proper climate and soil conditions for raising 
avocados, a genetically improved variety resistant to disease and extreme weather and whose 
fruit can remain on the tree ready to be picked anywhere from four to six months, a large pool of 
producers that obtained access to said avocado variety through private and public efforts, and a 
large domestic market capable of absorbing the avocado production all year long.  
 
Figure 1. Mexico’s Avocado Exports, 1972-97 
(Metric tons) 
 
Source: http://www.avocadosource.com/WAC4/WAC4_p393.htm and Contreras-Castillo (1999). 
 
3)  The Global Market and the Production Chain 
 
World-wide avocado production in 2001 was valued at US$ 2,650 million (FAOSTAT, 2001). 
Approximately 63 percent of this production is concentrated in six countries: Mexico, the United 
States, Colombia, Indonesia, Chile, and the Dominican Republic (FAOSTAT, 2000). Peru and 
New Zealand have recently entered the market. Mexico is the main grower, with its share 
                                                 
3 See http://www.aproam.com/. Indirect jobs relate to packing, transport, sales, and technical services.   8
representing 35.3 percent of the total production in 2001, or 89,300 tons. Mexico is followed by 
Chile with 56,200 tons, and South Africa with 45,600 tons in 2000 (FAOSTAT, 2000). 
Mexico is also the main consumer of avocados in the world, with annual consumption of 
around 817,000 tons, followed by the United States with 296,000 tons. France and the United 
States are the main importers (10,500 tons and 78,000 tons, respectively). The Japanese market is 
becoming increasingly significant (see Table 1). The normal transport of avocados is by sea, 
which allows low transportation costs and good quality.
4 In Mexico, there are 21,511 producers, 
279 packing plants and traders for the domestic market, more than 50 packing plants/exporters, 
and 14 industrialists that process the avocados into guacamole, pulp, halves, frozen products, 
beverages, and non-refined oil.  
 
Table 1. 
Avocado Production, Exports, Imports, and Consumption by Country, 2004 
(Thousands of tons) 
 
Country Production Exports  Imports  Consumption 
Mexico 987.00  142.25  2.62  740.36 
United States  162.72  9.65  155.61  295.80 
France 0.07  13.79  104.41  74.00 
Japan 0  0  30.49  27.08 
Chile 160.00  121.60  1.07  18.05 
South Africa  56.16  30.70  1.15  24.33 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from FAOSTAT (2007). 
      
 
Figure 2 shows the traditional production and export chain from planting and other 
production costs through final sale to the customer. For example in the United States, according 
to Figure 2, the final customer pays one dollar per avocado, or $3.00 per kilogram.  Of this, 
$1.18 goes to the retailer or supermarket (40 percent); $0.30 (10 percent) to the importer; $0.31 
(10 percent) to the exporter or packing plant; $0.21 (7 percent) to services such as APEAM-
USDA
  (U.S. Department of Agriculture) certification and promotion fees, professional fruit 
                                                 
4 For the varieties Hass and Fuerte for example, sea transportation is recommended in refrigerated containers cooled 
at 5 to 6º C, with controlled atmosphere, with a transit time of 22-24 days. Air transportation of avocados is 
profitable only in exceptional cases, for example when demand is high in an under-supplied market (Agexpront 
2004).    9
harvesting services, and transportation costs; $0.55 (18 percent) to the producer; and $0.45 (15 
percent) to other production costs such as planting, irrigation, fertilizers, and so on. In this 
traditional chain, Mexico’s value added sums to $1.52/kilogram, or 50 percent of the final value. 
 
Figure 2. 
Value Added at Each Stage of Production and Export 
(Percent and dollars per kilogram) 
 
    Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
  
The grower seems to be well positioned in the chain. At the moment, the producer sets 
the minimum he is willing to receive per kilogram, or $1.00/kilogram, which includes other 
production costs varying anywhere from $0.27 to $0.45 per kilogram. That is, the producer can 
potentially receive between 18 and 24 percent of the final value of the product. The producer, 
however, can be forced by the exporter or packing plant to pay APEAM-USDA certification and 
promotion fees of $0.11/kilogram. In this case, the producer’s revenue will vary between 15 
percent (high production costs and full certification fee) and 24 percent (low production costs 
and no certification fee) of the final value (see Figure 2). 
It appears that the exporter or packing plant depends heavily on its negotiating power 
over the producer and the importer. A weak exporter will receive about 10 percent of the final 
value (paying the full certification fee and facing a strong importer), without taking into account 
the operation costs of the packing plant. A stronger exporter with increased bargaining power 







































importer). If the exporter is capable of selling directly to retailers, such as commercial houses in 
the United States, its income might rise to 26 percent.  According to these figures, four additional 
observations can be drawn from Figure 2. 
 
•  Growers appear to realize extra-ordinary profits. The control over supply they 
have been obtained through the Juntas and Committees of Sanidad Vegetal 
has given them some market power. 
•  Producers are unable to become exporters because their only option would be 
to negotiate with the importer. Having spent most of their time in the field, it 
is unlikely that producers would be able to negotiate a good deal in the 
international markets. Obtaining the minimum 10 percent generally paid to 
exporters may not be sufficient to pay for the operating costs of the packing 
plant if the producer is not an efficient industrialist. In addition, growers own 
small lots; they need to team together with other growers for packing and 
transporting the fruit abroad (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). Furthermore, one 
particular grower only harvests certain sizes of fruit, at certain periods of the 
year, while the market needs constant supplies of all different sizes (Paz, 
interview, 11/27/06). 
•  Exporters with strong connections in the final market can avoid the importer 
and even negotiate a good deal with the retailer, which secures the exporter at 
least 24 percent of the final value. Perhaps for this reason, 80 percent of 
exports to the United States are conducted by U.S. multinational corporations 
such as Calavo, Mission, West Pak, Freshfruit, and Delmonte.  
•  Exporters need volume to survive; they seem to be squeezed between 
powerful U.S. retailers and organized local producers. 
 
4)  First Movers and Imitators 
 
4.1 First Mover: The Purepecha Group’s Early Start 
The first avocado exports were conducted by Don Leopoldo Vega, owner of the Purepecha 
Group, in 1970. Don Leopoldo, born in 1935, came from a family of agricultural producers 
(wheat, corn, and beans) and cattle raisers. When he was a child, the family farm had several 
avocado trees that were used to provide shade for the coffee plants. When he was 16 years old,   11
Don Leopoldo began working for a firm in which his uncle was a partner, Limones de 
Michoacán, farming melons, watermelons, and cotton. In the early 1960s, he started the 
Purepecha Group, farming avocados with improved varieties (see Section 2). He started his own 
avocado nursery and in 1962 and 1965, he planted Fuerte and Hass avocado varieties. Later, Don 
Leopoldo set up operation of the first mechanical packing equipment in the region, which was 
acquired from the agricultural state of Sinaloa. Before 1970, he sent the first avocado samples to 
Europe by plane, and in October 1970, he sent two containers to Rotterdam by ship (Vega, 
interview, 12/5/06). 
Don Leopoldo made his initial export contacts through the Instituto Mexicano de 
Comercio Exterior (IMCE), the Mexican Export Promotion Bank now called Bancomext. IMCE 
covered 50 percent of an exporter’s promotion expenses abroad. Technical assistance and 
production loans were granted at discounted rates by FIRA, the Central Bank’s branch for 
agricultural support (see the role of development banks in Section 6). The logistics of the 
Purepecha Group’s first shipment were made by Mr. Adalberto Palma, assistant to Agustín 
Legorreta, the president of the largest Mexican bank, Banamex, and a friend of Don Leopoldo. 
One container was sent from Veracruz port into the Golf of Mexico and the other a week later 
from Houston, Texas, perhaps to diversify the risk. Both containers arrived at the same time in 
Rotterdam. Although the client was located in Paris, Don Leopoldo saw the opportunity to sell 
the fruit at auction in Rotterdam at $2.00 per kilogram more than the price agreed with the client 
in France (Vega, interview, 12/5/06). 
From 1971 until the peso devaluation in 1976, Don Leopoldo exported avocados to 
France.  The 1976 devaluation, however, hindered avocado exports because the federal 
government maintained strict control of peso-dollar exchanges. Don Leopoldo was required to 
sell the dollars obtained through exports to the Mexican government at a discounted price, only 
to re-purchase them at a higher price in order to make the payment to the shipping firm. 
Devaluation and currency controls stopped Don Leopold’s exports (Vega, interview, 12/5/06). 
  The real export incentive for Don Leopoldo came in 1985 when, after a long period of 
failed attempts to export fresh flowers to the United States, he received full support from the 
Israeli Agrexco Corporation to conduct avocado exports throughout Europe. The contact came 
through an Israeli engineer who visited Mexico to obtain information and seeds for plants that 
could grow in dry and salty soil. He met with Mr. Sánchez Collín, former governor of the state of   12
Mexico and founder of the research institute of the same name, who in turn introduced him to 
Don Leopoldo (see the development of the Hass avocado variety in Section 2). After helping the 
Israeli engineer, Don Leopoldo obtained marketing assistance and information about clients in 
Europe, which helped to increase exports considerably (Vega, interview, 12/5/06). 
 
Figure 3.  Purepecha’s Export Associations, 1970-2006 
 
 Source: Authors. 
  
The Purepecha Group never worked with partners and did not belong to business 
associations. It only embarked on agreements in which “all parties had something to win, 
including the workers” (Vega, interview, 12/5/06). The Carmel-Purepecha agreement was 
probably successful because avocado production in Israel and Mexico is complementary. Israel’s 
avocado trees hit peak production from October to April, with Hass going from December to 
April and ending right when Mexico’s production starts. In 1990, the Purepecha Group 
established another business agreement with a foreign corporation, West Pak, a firm based in 
California that bought avocados in Mexico to be sold in Europe and Japan (Paz, interview, 
9/5/06). 
The main objective of the Purepecha Group was not to export, but to sell to the local 
market (Vega, interview, 12/5/2005). Due to the size of the Mexican market (see Table 1), the 
main goal of the Purepecha Group was to capture the Monterrey and Mexico City markets. Its 
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first promotion campaign was carried out in the 1970s through what was then the only 
commercial chain at the time, Comercial Mexicana; it was followed by television advertising on 
the popular Raúl Velazco Show on Channel 8 (Vega, interview, 12/5/06). 
Don Leopoldo’s son, Ricardo, continues with the family business. He holds engineering 
and MBA degrees and represents the second generation, which is taking over the avocado 
business. With the Purepecha Group being both an exporting and a producing company, Ricardo 
defends the exporters’ perspective, while his father does the same for the producers. For Ricardo, 
producers should focus on maximizing annual income per hectare and not maximizing price per 
kilogram. He believes producers are inefficient because farms in Michoacán have yields of 9-10 
ton/ha (the best farm in Uruapan reaches 25 ton/ha), while in other countries yields are 40 ton/ha. 
For him, Michoacán producers are even falling behind in quality.  
Because producers in Michoacán are not competitive in price, yield, or quality, Ricardo’s 
explanation of the avocado’s success is based only on comparative advantage. In addition, he 
believes that this advantage will soon expire as new producers in Chile, South Africa, Peru, 
Australia, and New Zealand take over the market. He even predicts that Mexican exports to the 
United States will only last at most eight years. That is perhaps why Ricardo decided to diversify 
into other products, such as papayas, star fruit, and berries. These products, which are managed 
through Fruticola Velo, a subsidiary of the Purepecha Group, are easy to finance, provide short-
term revenue, and—together with avocados—provide clients with a package of products. Clients 
appreciate this service because they prefer to deal with fewer suppliers (Vega, interview, 
8/23/06). 
 
4.2. First Mover: Socopaum’s Trial-and-Error Strategy 
 
Founded in 1977 by a group of 30 producers, the cooperative Socopaum’s main objective was to 
break the informal monopsony created by local buyers who had until that point artificially kept 
avocado prices down. After having succeeded in stabilizing prices that were 20-30 percent 
higher, Socopaum received an unexpected visit from Agrexco, a public-private Israeli 
consortium that decided to supply its European clients with Mexican avocados. Israel had 
suffered from extreme heat that year and it had lost 80 percent of the avocado crop. Striving to 
maintain their client bases, Israeli firms such as Agrexco and Hillroom were looking for 
suppliers in Mexico. However, they were surprised to encounter the austere packing systems and   14
plant facilities of Mexican avocado producers, who did not even possess cold rooms for the fruit. 
Hillroom made an unsuccessful export attempt and Agrexco cancelled the project, giving up the 
idea of transporting Mexican avocados to Europe in jumbo jets.  
Intrigued by the idea of exporting avocados to Europe, Socopaum members found a 
Spanish importer with clients in France, Pascual Hermanos. Originally from Valencia, the 
Pascual brothers had experience handling citrus, such as oranges and lemons, and they were 
willing to try something new. In November 1980, Socopaum successfully exported two 
containers to Europe. Perhaps it was good luck, but with the cold weather, the high quality of the 
avocados, and the right moment in the year, Socopaum sold the fruit at higher prices than 
expected (Illsley, interview, 12/6/06). Socopaum members decided to begin exporting in part 
because of Europe’s high demand, and in part because they were interested in diversifying their 
customer base. A 1977 forecast study made by FIRA, the Central Bank’s agricultural arm, 
predicted a fall in domestic prices due to the increasing number of avocado farms in Mexico 
(Illsley, interview, 12/6/06). Both the optimistic news brought by the Israeli firms regarding 
Europe’s avocado demand, and a pessimistic study of the domestic market triggered Socopaum’s 
exports. 
Tempted by the early success, Socopaum members sent 18 containers (540 tons) to 
France between January and February of the following year. Unfortunately, the operation was a 
failure. Pascual Hermanos, who had limited experience handling avocados, tried to speculate 
with the fruit and lost it due to improper storage, there were already avocados from Israel and 
Spain in the market, or the fruit in the 18 containers just did not arrive well (Illsley, interview, 
12/6/06). According to Ramón Paz, an industry consultant and former exporter (Paz, interview, 
9/5/06), early avocado exporters had three major difficulties when exporting to Europe. First, the 
fruit had to arrive fresh to the European consumer, after being shipped from the west coast of 
Mexico, through the Panama Canal, and across the Atlantic Ocean, without using temperature-
controlled facilities (the whole operation took 17-18 days versus 5-6 days when shipped from 
Israel). Second, some technical difficulties had not yet been resolved, such as the black spots that 
appear on the fruit due to cold weather during transportation. Lastly, new Mexican exporters had 
no experience negotiating fixed price contracts with European importers, who prefer to sell “on   15
consignment.” Adapting their strategy to the local market circumstances frequently resulted in 
large losses for the Mexican firms.
5  
After the failure, Socopaum decided to establish a committee to research the necessary 
elements to ensure they would be well prepared for exporting. The committee was formed by 
three of its most active members: Salvador García, Adolfo Barragán, and Carlos Illsley (Illsley, 
interview, 12/6/06). Both Salvador and Adolfo’s families were in the agro business. Salvador’s 
family came from Zamora, Michoacán where they cultivated and exported strawberries. Salvador 
was part of the third generation of strawberry producers (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). He had 
immigrated to Uruapan (a three-hour drive from Zamora) to start an avocado farm. Adolfo’s 
family was also from Michoacán. They cultivated melons in Apatzingan, Michoacán and 
pineapples in the state of Oaxaca (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
Carlos’ background was a little different. Although he was born in Michoacán and 
attended school in Uruapan with sons and daughters of avocado producers, he spoke perfect 
English, had traveled extensively, and maintained a rich network of international contacts (Paz, 
interview, 9/5/06). Carlos’ father, an American economist and World War II veteran, was 
interested in the development of local firms in China and Mongolia. He retired in Mexico and 
acquired an avocado farm in 1964. Carlos’ mother, an American free thinker of the 1960s, was 
interested in Mexican local customs and traditions. She and her husband set up a cooperative in 
Uruapan to run an 1880s textile plant, saving it from being demolished. In 1974, Carlos bought a 
commercial avocado farm and joined the group of producers. 
While conducting the review of how to prepare Socopaum for exporting, Carlos met an 
Israeli engineer who came to town with a Colombian delegation working on Michoacán’s fresh-
flowers-for-export project. The engineer provided him with the business information of a firm 
that had set up several avocado packing plants in Israel. Representatives of the Israeli firm 
visited Mexico, and after meeting with the committee, they struck a $25,000 deal to acquire a 
business plan with plant specifications and machinery. When the plan was presented to 
Socopaum members, the businessmen believed the project was too costly and voted against the 
deal. At that point, Salvador, Adolfo, and Carlos committed to conduct the task by themselves, 
                                                 
5 In the European market, 85 percent of the fruit and vegetable commerce is carried out on consignment. European 
importers sell the merchandise under the shipper’s account, and the producer’s final payment reflects product quality 
and market conditions at the time of the purchase. The importer then deducts 8-10 percent commission, as well as 
transport costs, tariffs, customs inspection costs, taxes, and so on, diminishing the final amount for the exporter (Paz, 
interview, 9/5/06).   16
and headed to Israel to research Israeli packing plants and their avocado export operations 
(Illsley, interview, 12/6/06).  
  What the three men learned in Israel ultimately shaped Michoacán’s avocado industry. 
Among the major innovations observed were (Illsley, interview, 12/6/06):  
 
•  Packing machinery that selected avocados by weight, with electronic scales, 
and classified each individual avocado. Up to this time, Michoacán’s packing 
plants had relied on experienced female workers who selected and classified 
the fruit without using scales (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
•  Pre-cooling and cooling systems to maintain the temperature of the fruit 
constant from immediately after packing to the moment it reached the client. 
Although the trip from Israel to Europe by sea lasted at most six days, the 
cooling systems could maintain the fruit’s condition much longer, which was 
ideal for trips across the Atlantic Ocean. 
•  Harvest systems for collecting the fruit on site. The procedure allowed the 
labor force to be concentrated in the harvesting process rather than in the 
handling of it. The fruit in Israel was collected in half-ton containers, which 
were manipulated by lift trucks. The fruit was indeed preserved in better 
condition than with the 20 to 30-kilogram plastic boxes used at the time in 
Mexico. When the Mexican plastic boxes were stacked on top of one another, 
they crushed the fruit, and the plastic boxes were easily stolen. 
•  Statistical analysis on the historical production of each avocado plot. Past 
records were kept for each farm along with the most recent production 
forecasts. 
 
Salvador, Adolfo, and Carlos covered the initial investment for the business plan to set up 
a packing plant with modern machinery. On their return to Mexico, they decided to pursue the 
export project. The total necessary investment reached $2.8 million, which required that they 
establish a new firm and invite new investors. Unfortunately, the 1982 debt crisis and 
devaluation put a halt to the project. Four years later, Adolfo and Carlos founded their own 
separate firm, called Agrifrut (Salvador had already left the group, see next section) (Illsley, 
interview, 12/6/06).   17
Adolfo and Carlos invited two new partners into the new enterprise: Jorge Fernández and 
Pascual Gally. Jorge’s entrance was indirect. He was first hired to construct the packing plant, 
and then he became a partner when Adolfo failed to remunerate him for the construction and 
offered him stock instead. This carried several repercussions for the new firm because Jorge, a 
civil engineer and construction contractor, lacked experience in the avocado industry. Other 
potential partners canceled their contribution when Jorge became a partner. Carlos introduced the 
project to Pascual, a Swiss engineer who was in the region because of the fresh-flower-to-export 
project. Pascual liked the avocado business plan and joined the group, providing fresh capital and 
new marketing channels in Europe. In Switzerland, his family had import-export enterprises 
(Illsley, interview, 12/6/06). 
In 1987, the firm Agrifrut began operations with the first exporter, Carlos Illsley, and the 
two newcomers, Jorge and Pascual. Agrifrut acquired the Israeli business strategy and equipment 
as planned. Pascual Gally opened an importing firm in Switzerland, Sunfresh, to buy avocados 
from Agrifrut (Illsley, interview, 12/6/06). Sunfresh would then re-sell the fruit to other Gally 
family enterprises. For the partners, Sunfresh represented an additional cost because it only 
received the fruit; but Sunfresh was indeed selling 26 avocado containers (520 tons) per week 
throughout Europe (Illsley, interview, 12/6/06). When Carlos and Pascual left the firm, Jorge 
took over Agrifrut, and remains its chief executive officer (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
For Agrifrut, the avocado business learning curve was laborious (Fernández, interview, 
8/21/06; Illsley, interview, 12/6/06).  There were a number of unknown skills to be mastered: 
 
•  Learn how to make the pallets of boxes 
•  Learn the cooling process 
•  Determine how to transport the fruit by sea for 18 days  
•  Deal with technical problems (black spots on the fruit, which was still not 
solved, although it is now preventable)  
•  Reach the distribution platforms of clients 
•  Learn about product presentation (4-kilogram boxes, such as in South Africa) 
•  Deal with being a one-product supplier versus selling several products 
•  Take the price of the fruit when containers reached Europe   18
•  Work with the structure of the firm (partners with different backgrounds and 
interests). 
 
5)  Imitators Go after the Feast: Garvi, Socoaac, Aguamich, Dovi, Vifrut… 
 
Right before the trip to Israel, Salvador García de Alba invited his friend Antonio Villaseñor to 
join to group. Antonio, who would become a large exporter himself, did not have experience in 
agro business; he ran a furniture store, but possessed good business sense. Although Antonio did 
not attend the business mission to Israel, he covered his share of the cost in order to buy into the 
business (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). Due to differing interests, Antonio and Salvador split 
from the rest of the group. Antonio and Salvador then founded the Garvi firm and adopted the 
business plan to set up a packing plant (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06).  
 
Figure 4. Socopaum and Its Followers, 1997-2006 
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Garvi was the first modern packing plant set up in the state of Michoacán intended 
principally for exports (Fernandez, interview, 8/21/06).
6 Garvi owners, who even set up their 
own brand, Garvi, exported the fruit to the Socopaum former client, Pascual Hermanos in 
France.
7 José María Pascual came to Mexico and personally supervised the operations 
(Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). However, the firm experienced some problems with the 
shipments. Although some arrived well, others did not. The main technical problem seemed to be 
the previously mentioned black spots that appeared on the fruit when humidity and temperature 
changed (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). Other reasons might have included Pascual’s lack of 
experience in selling avocados on consignment (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). The losses were 
too heavy to be handled by two people. As a result, Garvi closed down a year later, in 1984. 
Salvador kept title to the land and the building, and started a third firm named Albafrut. Antonio 
kept the machinery and joined the Socoaac Cooperative (Antonio Villaseñor, interview, 
12/5/06). 
Salvador’s newest firm, Albafrut, came to a tragic end. After 3 years of operation, the 
firm was bought by Jewish Iraqis established in Switzerland. Mr. Sushnani, an Israeli technician, 
and Mr. Abraham Cohen, a retired general, ran the new firm, which they renamed Nucal, or New 
California. In 1990, one member of the board, who was personally involved in the Iran-Contras 
scandal, died in a plane crash. This episode was known internationally as the “Guacamolegate.” 
The firm did not pay its debts and ultimately the plant was turned over to the workers and 
creditors, mainly avocado growers (Paz, interview, 9/5/06).  
Antonio’s new venture ran with better luck. Socoaac (Sociedad Cooperativa de 
Agricultores de Aguacate del Cupatitzio) was formed by a group of 20 new producers in 1983. 
The following year, Antonio Villaseñor joined the group and sold them the machinery acquired 
in Israel. Socoaac bought it through a credit from Bancomer, a commercial private bank. The 
same year Socoaac became a limited liability corporation, a private rural firm, and Antonio sold 
his furniture store to obtain Socoaac stocks. Antonio became the firm’s general manager and by 
1985, Socoaac began to sell avocados in the domestic market. In 1986, Socoaac received a visit 
from Mission, a California-based avocado corporation that was interested in indirectly exporting 
                                                 
6 Another packing plant, La Tarazca, started operating near Morelia, the state capital. It was even inaugurated by the 
then state governor and former presidential candidate Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas. La Tarazca did not export because the 
domestic market was rather strong; all production was sold domestically (Antonio Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). 
7 Pascual Hermanos was later sold to Chiquita (Paz, interview, 9/5/06).   20
Mexican avocados. Socoaac-Mission exported avocados to Rotterdam to a new firm called 
Exotic, run by Francois Teisstre, a former fruit dealer in a French corporation with experience 
handling avocados from Israel. Socoaac-Mission shipments increased from 1-3 containers per 
week (20-60 tons) to 3-6 containers per week (60-120 tons). Six months later, Socoaac-Mission 
started exporting one container per week to Japan (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). 
The relationship with Mission formalized and expanded Socoaac’s knowledge of the 
packing and exporting processes. Although Antonio felt that a significant amount had been 
learned from Pascual Hermanos (the Spanish importer that managed citrus), they learned the 
specifics of the business from Mission (see below). The diffusion of knowledge was carried out 
through Mission’s local manager, Ezequiel García, who was working full-time in the operations 
section of Socoaac’s packing plant. When Ezequiel encountered doubts or questions on any 
specific issued, he would forward the question directly to Mission’s headquarters in California 
(Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). Thanks to Ezequiel’s follow-up, dramatic improvements were 
implemented in Mission’s Mexico plant.  These included: 
 
•  Changing harvesting tools to improve quality  
•  Establishing uniform weight ranks for the avocados 
•  Using waxed boxes that repeal humidity 
•  Affixing plastic corners to secure the boxes in the pallets 
•  Utilizing precise wood platforms for pallet bases 
•  Storing fruit in cold rooms after packing it and not after harvesting it 
•  Maintaining cold rooms at a specific temperature during the cooling stage 
•  Negotiating fixed price contracts with importers. 
 
Mission also bought avocados from San Lorenzo, which was owned by Don Joaquín 
Barragán, a local grower who also became an exporter (Frutas del Sol in Tinguindín). Mission 
also bought fruit from Don Joaquin’s nephew, Mario Rivas (Global Frut). The fruit from these 
packing plants was then exported to Japan (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). Mario also sold fruit to Fresh 
Directions, another Californian-based firm (Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). Today Mario is the 
largest exporter to Japan. According to Mario Rivas, he learned from Mission and Fresh 
Directions practically the same business specifics as those mentioned by Antonio, Socoaac’s   21
general manager. The California-based corporations acted as disseminators of production and 
export knowledge.
8  
By 1991, after eight years in operation, Socoaac had proven to be a sustainable firm, and 
the partners decided to make it a fully private corporation, changing its name to Aguamich,
9 S.A. 
de C.V. (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). With sales booming, the partners, mainly avocado 
producers, became more interested in becoming involved in management decisions. For 
example, they felt they should be included in setting the price at which Aguamich would buy the 
avocados from their own farms. Not being a producer himself, Antonio (now Aguamich general 
manager) did not understand why it would be necessary for Aguamich to pay a higher price when 
the same product could have been supplied by other producers in the region at a lower price. As 
a result, Antonio left the company in 1993, only to found another new one, Fruticola Dovi, S.A. 
de C.V., with the Doddoli family (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). Aguamich had financial 
problems; it remains closed (Villaseñor Jr., interview, 12/5/06).   
The Doddoli family owned sawmills and managed the harvesting services of pine tree 
plantations. It got involved in the avocado industry through farms, packing plants, harvesting 
services, and guacamole exports. In fact, two Doddoli brothers eventually became Antonio’s 
brothers-in-law. Therefore, the new firm, Dovi (owned 75 percent by the Doddoli’s and 25 
percent by Antonio) was a family business. Dovi operated for only two years because tensions 
emerged between the producer family, which was interested in selling fruit to Dovi at a high 
price, and Antonio’s commercial interest in buying fruit from local producers at lower prices and 
better quality (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). 
In 1995, Antonio left Dovi to start a new firm, Vifrut, this time with his own sons and no 
producers. Antonio Villaseñor, Jr. moved to Paris to run Vifrut’s marketing operations from 
there. That year, Vifrut was exporting 10 containers (200 tons) per week to France, England, 
Sweden, and Spain, and one to Canada (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06).
10 However, the market 
conditions for fruit in Europe quickly and radically changed. The Eurogap norm required that 
farms exporting products to Europe comply with a set of food security, innocuous, ecological, 
and social security regulations (Villaseñor, Jr., interview, 12/5/06).  Some of these norms in fact 
                                                 
8 As in the Socoaac-Mission experience, Agrifrut  developed a relationship with Calavo, the largest avocado 
corporation in California, Agrifrut-Calavo. 
9 Aguacates Michoacanos. 
10 In 2005, Vifrut even exported avocados to Chile (Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06).   22
depended on the will of the grower and not of the packing plants or exporters. In addition to 
these tougher regulations, newcomers entered the avocado market. Peru, Chile, Spain, Israel, 
South Africa, Kenya, Algeria, and Turkey all became competitors for Vifrut. For these reasons, 
and because the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened the U.S. market to 
Mexican avocados in 1997, Vifrut decided to supply the fruit exclusively to North American 
markets. Today, Vifrut exports 15-20 containers (300-400 tons) per week to the United States 
(Villaseñor, interview, 12/5/06). 
 
6)  Exporters Conquer Other Markets: Japan, the United States, and Korea 
  
6.1. Grabbing the Neighbor’s Treasure: The Highly Valued Japanese Market 
 
The introduction of a new fruit to an Asian market, a rather difficult task, was originally 
conducted in the 1980s by a group of California (U.S.) producers and packers organized through 
a consortium called Avocal  (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). They supplied Japan with California 
avocados from April to August and, several years later, with Mexican avocados during the off 
season, from August to March.  
When California suffered from cold weather, its companies turned to Mexican packing 
plants that could provide fresh avocados throughout the year. That is, Mexican packing became a 
maquila industry in which packing plants bought the fruit and selected, harvested, packed, and 
shipped it through Avocal to customers of Mexican packers: Calavo, Mission, Index, and so on. 
The operation was carried out according to the technical and phytosanitary specifications 
provided by the buyer and the Japanese importer.
11  The Japanese consumer preferred Mexican 
avocados to California avocados. After this, all avocados shipped to Japan by Californian (and 
Mexican) producers came from Mexico. Producers in California faced no difficulty in selling 
their fruit in the protected and expanding U.S. domestic market. The avocados were exported by 
the Mexican subsidiaries of the California companies (Mission and Calavo), as well as by some 
newcomers supported by foreign investment (Fresh Directions). Fresh Directions Mexicana was 
the first company to export Mexican avocados to Japan on a year-round basis, in the 1998-99 
season. 
One of these maquila packing plants, Global Frut, which had previous experience 
exporting to Canada and France, obtained information from the Mexican shipping company 
                                                 
11 Regulations were not high because there are no avocado growers in Japan.   23
TMM about a Japanese importer who was seeking Mexican suppliers of avocados. Rivas, the 
owner of Global Frut, the main exporter to Japan, found the Japanese market lucrative, and 
wanted to expand his operation beyond the constraints of the highly competitive domestic market 
(Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). Having learned about “quality parameters and the ways to handle 
and pack the fruit” from its maquila operations for the Californian firms Mission and Fresh 
Directions, Global Frut started shipping avocados directly to Japan (Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). 
Soon, Rivas established a commercial relationship with a second Japanese importer that he met 
at an agricultural trade fair. Today, Rivas is the main avocado exporter to Japan (Rivas, 
interview, 8/21/06).
12 
From a logistical standpoint, exporting fresh avocados to Japan was not at all different 
from exporting them to Europe; the transit time to Japan from the West Mexican shore is shorter. 
The Japanese market has few importers who tend to be loyal to their suppliers and are dedicated 
to building long-term relationships with both the supplier and wholesalers in Japan. In a way, 
exporting to Japan represents a more stable business compared with exporting to France, for 
example. The challenging aspect of engaging in business in Japan was to understand what 
Japanese buyers wanted; “the way they think, they way they act, how they make decisions” 
(Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). Other difficulties included securing the selling price a week before 
harvesting the fruit. Since most packing plants do not grow the avocados they export (or if they 
do, the quantity represents less than 10 percent of their export operations), securing an export 
price before buying the product from local producers represents a risk that, in this case, Global 
Frut is taking.
13 Lastly, Japanese consumers demand better presentation of the fruit. They accept 
no dark spots or any other alteration (Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). The followers incorporated 
these procedures within their own processes. The Japanese market quickly became the second 
most important market for Mexico (2,270 tons in the 2003-04 season) (Salazar et al., 2004). 
 
6.2. Breaking into the Impossible: The U.S. Market 
 
In Michoacán, the primary harvest season is October to February, although production is year-
round. Therefore, there exists some complementarily between the Mexican and U.S. production 
cycles; the peak season in California and Florida is usually from March to August. However, 
                                                 
12 Today Rivas exports 7-8 containers to Japan per week (Rivas, interview, 8/21/06). That is about 23,000 tons per 
year or about $35-40 million in annual exports. 
13  Nowadays, all exporters do the same, for all international markets (Paz, interview, 9/5/06).   24
Mexican avocados have traditionally faced great challenges in meeting U.S. standards of product 
quality and safety. In 1914, California avocado producers claimed that Mexican avocados were 
infested with various insects, particularly the avocado seed weevil, and the United States 
imposed the phytosanitary ban that prevented Mexican avocado exports into the U.S. market for 
the next 70 years (APROAM, web page). In the 1970s, continuing requests for import permits 
were submitted by Mexican producers. The detection of seed weevils during some of these 
surveys resulted in continuance of the prohibitory regulatory policy of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APROAM, web page). 
According to the California Avocado Society, trade liberalization and the harmonization 
of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures have, over time, altered the backdrop against 
which governments examine animal and plant health issues as they relate to the movement of 
agricultural commodities across national boundaries (Bellamore, 2002). For most of the last 
century, the protection of plant health was maintained through a policy of pest exclusion. 
Beginning with trade liberalization in 1990, the rules have changed. 
Debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s placed trade between the United States, Canada, and Mexico at the top of Mexico’s 
national agenda. Although the primary goal was the phased removal of most tariffs by 2004, the 
legislation also provided the setting for the harmonization of sanitary and SPS measures between 
trading partners (Bellamore, 2002). 
The California Avocado Society also states that NAFTA confirmed the right of each 
country to establish the level of SPS protection that it considers appropriate, provided that SPS 
measures are applied only to the extent necessary to achieve the chosen level of protection, and 
that they are applied in such a way that do not constitute discriminatory restrictions on trade 
(Bellamore, 2002). The members of NAFTA have also agreed to accept one another’s SPS 
measures as equivalent, provided that the exporting country makes available scientific evidence 
that objectively demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing country’s appropriate level 
of protection. 
In addition, with the implementation of NAFTA, the U.S. government came under 
increased pressure to facilitate imports of agricultural commodities from Mexico and Canada. 
Maintaining an exclusionary policy had become untenable for the U.S. government. The   25
consequences of maintaining such a policy provoked claims from Mexico and Canada that the 
United States was not complying with the provisions of NAFTA (Bellamore, 2002). 
The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is the primary 
government branch charged with implementing the phytosanitary provisions of NAFTA and 
other trade agreements. In May 1992, APHIS rejected a draft work plan prepared by Mexico for 
importing Hass avocados into the United States (Bellamore, 2002). 
During 1992-93, Mexico sent three work plans requesting the importation of Mexican 
avocados into the United States. In July 1993, one of the proposals was approved.  The entrance 
of Mexican avocados into Alaska was authorized under specified conditions (APROAM, web 
page). During the next two years, Mexico conducted further research and pest surveys. In June 
1994, new data were submitted to the United States. The new work plan specifically requested 
that Mexico be allowed to ship to 19 northeastern states from October through February. On July 
3, 1995, a proposal was published to allow the entrance of Hass avocado destined for certain 
U.S. states under additional phytosanitary requirements. The imports were restricted to the 
period of the months between November and February (APROAM, web page).  
Avocado producers in California and Florida opposed the entrance of the Mexican 
avocados, arguing that the import was an intolerable risk of pests to the domestic avocado 
industry. Other producers in the United States demonstrated their concern when Mexico adopted 
similar restrictive regulations for products such as apples, peaches, wheat, and other agricultural 
products. It took an army of specialists (Mexican trade representatives and avocado association 
lobbyists hired by producers and packers) to overcome the U.S. avocado tariff barrier. 
On July 15, 1997, Mexico and the United States signed an agreement in which avocado 
exports from the Mexican state of Michoacán were allowed into 19 U.S. states: Maine, New 
Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky. Imports into the District of Columbia were also permitted. Only 
imports from certain producers were allowed into these states, and only from November to 
February, when the cold temperature was sufficiently low to eliminate any pests that may have 
survived the phytosanitary control treatments. Later, the number of states permitting Mexican 
avocado imports increased to 32 (APROAM, web page). The price of avocados in approved 
states fell by between 8 and 41 percent, in comparison with the rest of the states in which the   26
decrease was between 1 and 3 percent (APROAM).
14 Exports of Hass avocados to the United 
States increased from 6,031 tons in the 1997-98 season to 42,607 tons in the 2003-04 season. 
The value of exports in 2003-04 was 93.7 million dollars (FAOSTAT, 2005). 
With the opening of the U.S. market to the Mexican avocado, California-based avocado 
corporations sent their own packing operations to Michoacán. Some of these operations, such as 
Mission, were established well before the opening of the U.S. market; others, like Calavo and 
West Pak, already had Mexican subsidiaries, although they were not packers yet. The California-
based corporations imported Mexican avocados into the United States using the distribution 
channels they already had in the country. Among the firms that set up locations in Mexico were 
Calavo, Mission, Fresh Directions, West Pak, and Delmonte. The establishment of large 
American corporations in Michoacán had several impacts in the region (Morales, interview, 
8/21/06). First, the new plants provided approximately 2,000 jobs in the region.
15 Second, they 
benefited local producers by paying for the crops with cash on the same day of the operation. In 
contrast, local packing plants were paying with a lag of 7-14 days. Third, U.S. firms pressured 
local packing plants to improve their relationship with local producers to stabilize and secure the 
supply of the fruit. Lastly, they also subcontracted local packing plants to conduct maquila 
operations for them when their own packing plants reached full capacity (Morales, interview, 
8/21/06). 
How likely would it be that other Mexican states would be granted permission to export 
avocados into the United States? Producers would need to first comply with the norm NOM 066 
FITO 2002, which is challenging if they do not cooperate with each other.
16 Other states do not 
pose a threat to Michoacán, which is by far the largest grower of avocados. With 84,000 
hectares, Michoacán is followed by Nayarit (2,400 hectares) and Morelos (2,300 hectares) 
(Torres, interview, 8/22/06). In addition, setting up export operations destined for the United 
                                                 
14 Before NAFTA, the general tariff applied to avocados was 13.2 cents per kilogram. Then, with the agreement 
Agricultura de la Ronda de Uruguay (AARU), tariffs were reduced to 11.22 cents per kilogram for a 6-year period 
beginning in 1995; due to NAFTA, this tariff was reduced for Mexican avocados too, but for a period of 10 years 
(Orden, 1994). Mexico loaded a tariff of 20 percent on avocado imports. Under NAFTA, the tariff has been 
eliminated gradually over a period of 10 years. Canada does not impose tariffs on avocado imports because it does 
not produce them (Orden, 1994).  
15 However, many of the workers come from Mexican owned packing plants currently in operation or from the ones 
that went bankrupt (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
16 To eliminate disease, growers need to set up a coordinated plan because if one plot is not treated, the disease will 
spread again. For one plot, it takes at least three years to clean up; when there is no coordination among the owners 
of the plots next to it, it might never comply with the norm (Torres, interview, 8/22/06).   27
States requires time. For example, it would take at least four years for a new grower who buys 
land and plants avocado plants, to export to the United States. Trees do not provide fruit until 
their third or fourth year, and the certification process takes more than a year (Torres, interview, 
8/22/06). 
The process of approval to export avocados to the United States is the following. First, 
officials from Juntas Locales (a public-private local sanitary association, established according to 
Mexico’s phytosanitary law) inspects and approves the farm. Second, officials from USDA do 
the same. Third, to prevent the farm from obtaining and spreading disease, producers are 
required to adhere to culturally foreign activities such as picking up the fruits that fall onto the 
ground, removing all the dry branches from the trees, and keeping the trees clear of any other 
plants that grow in the wild. When the fruit is ready, producers request harvesting approval from 
Juntas Locales and the USDA officials. The Juntas are not supposed to “approve” harvesting; 
they are responsible for issuing documents for transporting the fruit harvested from orchards 
previously approved; however, they use this mechanism to control the actual volume of fruit 
harvested in the whole region (Torres, interview, 8/22/06). If the fruit goes to the United 
Kingdom, additional measures need to be taken, such as avoiding forbidden agrochemicals (e.g., 
ethyl-parathion) and passing inspections on social and legal compliance (Torres, interview, 
8/22/06; Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
 




Guacamole exports from Mexico began in the 1990s with the efforts of three multinational 
corporations, Calavo, Avomex, and Simplot, and one local grower, Avomex (Doddoli, interview, 
8/22/06).  
The original idea behind the production of guacamole was to add value to local 
agricultural products before exporting, taking advantage of the then low avocado prices. Because 
it is not necessary for avocados destined for guacamole to possess market presentation, or be a 
specific size, guacamole producers have access to avocados at lower prices than the packing 
business. Years earlier, the price for one kilogram of avocado was around U.S. $0.10. By 
transforming the fresh fruit into guacamole paste (and sometimes also adding onions, peppers, 
and tomatoes), it could be sold frozen at a considerably higher price. Unfortunately, recently   28
avocado prices have increased to US$1.40 per kilogram, while the price of guacamole has 
remained steady in the United States. As a result, guacamole producers face low margins and 
large fixed costs (Doddoli, interview, 8/22/06). Producing guacamole was attractive when 
exports of avocado fruit were forbidden, and when prices were low. 
 
7.2. Avocado Oil 
Regarding avocado oils, Mexican manufacturers have encountered mixed results. One of the first 
movers to export fresh avocados, Mr. Joaquín Barragán (who was also involved in several other 
business areas) also began manufacturing avocado oil, although he had yet to secure a buyer. He 
probably saw potential to place avocado oil in the cosmetics industry. As the containers of oil 
piled up, Mr. Barragán hired a French engineer, Mr. Charles Guillard (who was living in Mexico 
and who had recently made some shipments of fresh avocados to colleagues in France) to market 
the avocado oil in France (Guillard, interview, 8/23/06). 
Mr. Guillard traveled to France but was unsuccessful in marketing the product. Months 
later, a French pharmaceutical corporation contacted him to buy avocado oil, but requested that it 
be produced differently (pressed, as opposed to mashed through centrifugation). The production 
of such oil demanded the establishment of an entirely new plant. The French engineer obtained 
investment funds and initiated the project. After several misunderstandings, he established his 
own plant to manufacture this particular avocado oil for the French pharmaceutical corporation 
(Guillard, interview, 8/23/06). 
The French pharmaceutical corporation extracts a molecule from the pressed avocado oil 
that is then transformed into an active component of the medicine Piascledine, which is used to 
relieve arthritis pain. The corporation holds the patent for the extraction process as well as the 
patent to transform it into medicine (Guillard, interview, 8/23/06). The medicine is pending 
approval in the United States and Mexico. Large quantities of avocado oil will be required to 
produce sufficient Piascledine for the consumer market in the United States. The French 
engineer, with the support of the corporation, has established a production plant four times larger 
than the original plant in anticipation of future demand. 
Why did the corporation support the manufacturing of avocado oil in Mexico as opposed 
to some other country? Previously, the corporation relied on a single avocado oil grower, based 
in South Africa. By owning two avocado growing operations based in geographically dispersed   29
locations, the corporation reduces the risk of a breakdown or an increase in price by the supplier. 
The producers are sufficiently distanced to prevent collusion, price setting, and acquisition of 
monopoly power. Both understand that the corporation is also the monopsony buyer. In sum, it is 
unlikely that another firm would begin manufacturing this medicine in the near future. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that imitators would set up additional plants to produce avocado oil for 
pharmaceutical use. 
 
7.3. Harvesting or Picking Firms 
As a last spin-off on avocado-related exports, some service businesses have been developed in 
Mexico. For example, there are new companies that specialize in the harvesting of avocados 
according to the size, color, and maturity of the fruit. That is, the workers only pick the type of 
avocados demanded by specific clients (smaller for Texas, larger for Japan, and so on). The rest 
are left on the tree to be picked in 2-3 months, when they are ready for export to other markets or 
domestic consumption. 
These harvesting companies hire their own workers, train them, and group them in 
cuadrillas (crews) that are sent to the plantations to pick the fruit one by one off the trees. They 
are considered spin-offs from packing plant operations because the first harvesting companies 
were founded by former employees and family members of packing plants involved in exporting. 
The first harvesting firm was set up by Mr. Antonio Villaseñor. After Mr. Villaseñor began his 
harvesting company, the majority of the other packing plants also decided to subcontract their 
harvesting operations (Paz, interview, 9/5/06).  
According to the president of the Harvesting Firms Association (SUMA), the success of a 
harvesting firm depends on the firm’s knowledge of its clients, its understanding of where each 
specific avocado farm (and plot) is located within the region, and the expertise of its workers in 
selecting the fruits to harvest. The work is quite dangerous. People die each year, due primarily 
to falls from trees, touching a high voltage electrical cable, or traffic accidents while riding in the 
back of the fruit collection trucks. The danger is perhaps one of the reasons packing plants, 
especially long-standing companies and transnational corporations, hire harvesting firms. The 
packing plants avoid assuming responsibility for accidents during this part of the production 
chain. Today, this industry employs more than 5,000 people, who earn U.S. $18-20 a day for six 
hours of work, which is 3-4 times the minimum wage (Doddoli, interview, 8/22/06).   30
8)  The Government Gets Its Act Together 
 
Government participation in the development of the avocado industry has taken place in five 
different areas: (1) production and distribution of avocado trees through CONAFRUT, the 
National Commission of Fruit Growing; (2) access to funds through the development banks 
FIRA and BANCOMEXT; (3) provision of a regulatory framework to control the use of 
pesticides and chemicals; (4) establishment of certification bodies such as the state committees 
and local Juntas de Sanidad Vegetal to ensure compliance with standards; and (5) active support 
through the NAFTA negotiations to open up the U.S. market.  
Production and distribution of the new Hass variety of avocado were carried out by both 
a government agency, CONAFRUT, and private entrepreneurs in the 1960s (see Section 2). 
CONAFRUT’s director, Dr. Sánchez-Colín, an agronomist and former governor of the state of 
Mexico, allocated resources to the improvement of plant varieties with potential for growth, 
which included avocados. CONAFRUT established its own commercial nurseries in the early 
1960s with the support of the Sánchez-Colín Foundation, an agricultural research institute 
located in the state of Mexico. CONAFRUT and the foundation donated Hass avocado trees to 
help farmers obtain access to the Hass variety (Villaseñor, interview, 8/5/06). 
Access to funds for both cultivation and international trade of avocados was provided by 
FIRA and BANCOMEXT (Paz, interview, 9/5/06; Vega, interview, 12/5/06). FIRA, a second-
tier bank, is the agricultural development branch of Mexico’s Central Bank. FIRA provides both 
the collateral and the funds to banks that lend to producers. FIRA provides business and 
technical assistance to producers to secure maximum returns on investment. BANCOMEXT, the 
import-export federal development bank, acts primarily in the promotion of Mexican products 
abroad in order to increase exports. This bank, which has offices in Mexican embassies, seeks 
potential clients abroad and assists Mexican exporters in developing commercial networks with 
these new contacts. Once the contract has been signed, BANCOMEXT provides a loan to 
exporters for business operations. Both FIRA and BANCOMEXT lend money to producers and 
exporters at reduced interest rates. 
In terms of the regulatory framework, federal laws were to be administered under the 
Phytosanitary Law of Mexico, which also regulated production, pesticide use, and imports of 
agricultural chemicals. Specific articles in the legislation required producers to register their use 
of insecticides, herbicides, and fertilizers with the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGARPA). The   31
Phytosanitary Law established the legal and normative procedures for the standardization of 
avocado production in the industry. At the same time, the legislation provided some teeth for 
local and state authorities to enforce compliance with these standards through the issuance of 
mandatory certification permits for producers planning to sell their crops to local packing plants 
for export. Certification permits are currently issued only by the local Plant Health Boards and 
State Committees of Sanidad Vegetal, a public-private regulation agency set up under the 
supervision of the Federal Agricultural Ministry.  
A Junta de Sanidad Vegetal (or Plant Health Board) is a local body formed by both 
producers and public agricultural officials. Decisions are made by consensus or majority vote. 
The boards are usually headed by a local grower, giving producers a real voice in the decision-
making process. State committees are formed by a representative from each local board and 
public officials at the state level. The president of the committee is designated by the members of 
the 26 local boards (Perfino, interview, 8/22/06). The president is generally one of the producers 
in the region with leadership skills. The committee’s budgetary resources are tapped from the 
producers themselves (40 percent), the Federal Agricultural Secretariat (30 percent), and the state 
government (30 percent) (Perfino, interview, 8/22/06).
17 Boards and committees monitor 
compliance with the phytosanitary standards. Their decisions and resolutions are official and 
binding. Thanks to the efforts of the juntas and committees, a large production area in 
Michoacán is now free of pests, an essential requirement to qualify the avocados grown there for 
export (Perfino, interview, 8/22/06).
18 
Although the phytosanitary regulations are overseen by the Agricultural Ministry, the 
Economics Ministry supervises compliance with export Norm 016 for avocados. Norm 016 
establishes the quality standards for the fruit, including color, size, texture, and so on. Courses 
for certifying officials on Norm 016 have been given at a local university in Michoacán, where 
approximately 100 officials have been trained. In a political maneuver, the plant health boards 
and committees hired these officials to provide Norm 016 certification to their farms. Currently, 
the boards and committees manage both phytosanitary and Norm 016 certifications (Paz, 
interview, 11/27/06). 
                                                 
17 Each grower must pay for the cost of certification, which is currently around U.S. $90 per hectare (Mendoza, 
interview, 12/4/06). 
18 The total area of the 12 municipalities declared pest-free by SAGARPA-USDA is 34,754.51 hectares (Comité 
Estatal 2006).   32
The elimination of pests in the avocado region of Michoacán was considered a striking 
success.
19 However, by regulating the weekly permits, which specify the name of the orchards 
and the quantity of tons that can be sold to packing plants for export, juntas and committees are 
in fact regulating supply. Packing companies, which are not represented in the plant health 
boards and committees, often complain that producers use these organizational bodies to reduce 
output and reach their target price-floor of $1.00/kilogram. The producers, who do not feel 
pressured to sell the avocados quickly (because they can remain on the avocado tree for several 
months ready to be picked without spoiling), are willing to wait to harvest until the price is right. 
Ultimately, both the producers and packing companies agreed that despite their differences, 
regulating supply was not detrimental because prices have remained stable in the United States. 
Boards and committees are not the only institutions charged with enforcing phytosanitary 
standards. As part of the NAFTA negotiations, the Mexican government allowed the USDA to 
establish an office in Michoacán to issue phytosanitary certifications to each container of 
avocados shipped to the United States.
20 This office manages a network of 30 USDA certification 
officials, each one assigned to a packing plant that exports fruit to the United States.
21 Instead of 
dealing individually with each grower and exporter, the USDA demanded the creation of a local 
Mexican organization that would handle the relationship and cover USDA personnel and 
certification expenses. Local producers and packing companies founded the Association of 
Producers and Exporters of Avocados from Michoacán, AC (APEAM) as well as a collection 
mechanism to pay for the certification services (Scheidt, interview, 8/21/06).  
 
9)  Local Organizations 
 
The Michoacán avocado industry has gone through a series of organizational periods. The first 
associations were founded by private land owners who sought to defend their property against 
government land re-distribution programs. Subsequently, the organizations began to play a role 
in federal and state politics. The organizations then evolved to confront the needs of the market 
and foreign trade, where producers, pickers, transporters, and packers needed to work together to 
                                                 
19 It would take at least two years for growers from another state, such as Jalisco or the state of Mexico, to eradicate 
pests after they began to follow the advice of Michoacán growers. Otherwise, the pest problem in these states would 
never be abated (Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06).  
20 This was not a new practice for the USDA, which had been running the USDA program for mangoes and citrus in 
Mexico since the 1980s (see the counterfactual section below) (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). 
21 USDA certification officials and board officials work side by side in the packing facilities (Paz, interview, 
11/27/06).   33
eradicate pests and increase productivity. Specialized organizations were included to provide 
technical support. Lastly, in an effort to channel resources toward long-term projects, the federal 
government set up the Sistema-Producto Comites (Production-System Committees), an umbrella 
forum for supplier, grower, and exporter organizations to negotiate the direction of the industry.  
Conflicts about the ownership of land arose in the 1940s when a volcanic eruption 
instigated the migration of native people out of certain areas.  When they returned, they found 
their land occupied. Land ownership conflicts continued through the 1970s, especially during 
President Echeverría’s land re-distribution programs. As a result, organizations were created to 
defend property from expropriation, communal redistribution, and ejido enlargements. In the 
1970s, the majority of avocado orchards were privately owned. Therefore, most organizations 
created during that time in the avocado industry were producer associations, such as small 
property owner associations and local grower associations. Beyond defending property rights, 
these organizations took it upon themselves to conduct common purchases and set minimum 
prices for the fruit. The 1936 law of agricultural associations (Ley de Asociaciones Agrícolas) 
provided the legal framework for organizations to operate and belong to the social-political 
branch (CNOP) of the PRI, the party that governed Mexico for more than 70 years (Paz, 
interview, 11/27/06). 
Local associations became a political target when former Michoacán PRI governor 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano (1980-86) became the presidential candidate of an opposition 
leftist party, PRD. As Michoacán was the home state to Cuauhtémoc as well as his father (former 
president General Lázaro Cárdenas, who was famous for nationalizing the oil industry), 
Cardenismo had deep roots in the area. Concerned that local organizations would support the 
Cardenista platform, Luis Martínez Villicaña, the then PRI state governor (1986-88) and former 
Land Reform Minister, updated the Unión Agrícola Estatal in 1987 (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). 
The role of the State Agricultural Union was to eradicate Cardenismo ideals in rural Michoacán. 
Advised by a former avocado grower and exporter, Ramón Paz, the president of the Union, 
Guido Doddoli, set up among other things three committees: the Technical Research Committee 
(Comité Técnico de Investigación), for conducting applied research; the Foreign Trade 
Committee (Comité de Comercio Exterior), for dealing with foreign trade; and the Domestic 
Sales Committee (Comité de Comercializadora Nacional), for marketing avocados in the 
domestic market (Paz, interview, 11/27/06).   34
Although the original idea of controlling Cardenismo in Michoacán was not successful, 
the committees set the basis for the formation of independent associations, which were more 
interested in the development of the avocado industry.
22 The Technical Research Committee 
established an independent body, or patronato, to channel state resources toward avocado 
research. It coordinated activities with the then national institutes for agriculture, forestry, and 
livestock (currently merged into the INIFAP). INIFAP and Fundación Sánchez-Colín, which 
runs an avocado gene plasma bank (see Section 4), are today’s main avocado research institutes 
in Mexico. The Foreign Trade Committee set up the first export association, ASEEAM, or 
Asociación de Empresarios Exportadores de Aguacate de Michoacán (see the role of ASEEAM 
below). Lastly, the Domestic Sales Committee tried to found an association similar to ASEAM, 
but the large number of packing companies for the domestic market did not see the need for it. 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the increasing market power of domestic 
supermarket chains and falling avocado prices hit producers hard. As a result, an independent 
association of packers for the domestic market, titled UDECAM (the Michoacán Avocado 
Packers’ Union), was indeed formed
23 (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). 
By the mid-1990s, the new PRI governor, Victor Manuel Ticono Rubi (1996-2002), 
believed the political growth of the PRD, the left national political party formed by Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas and others should be limited. The new governor “modernized” the 1936 Federal Law 
on Agricultural Associations, drafting Michoacán’s own legislation for agricultural associations. 
The 1998 law forced rural firms in a municipality to join one association linked to a state-
controlled umbrella organization.
24 The avocado industry in Michoacán, however, was already 
organized at the local level. In the municipality of Uruapan, there were four avocado producer 
associations. In addition, the 1984 Phytosanitary Law set up the local plant health boards and 
committees, where avocado producers, together with SAGARPA officials, issued phytosanitary 
permits (see Section 7). Consequently, the avocado associations registered at the federal level 
                                                 
22 Although Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas officially lost the 1988 presidential election against Carlos Salinas de Gortari, he 
obtained the majority of the votes in Michoacán. Luis Martínez Villicaña was then forced to step down 
(http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Mart%C3%ADnez_Villica%C3%B1a).   
23 UDECAM, a 16-year-old packer’s union based in Uruapan, has a membership of 61 (out of 325) state packing 
companies. In addition to providing loans for its members, UDECAM is a forum for packers to exchange 
information on quality improving methods, prices, payment periods, types of packing materials, and so on (Morales, 
interview 8/21/06).  
24 The idea was to set up one association for each product in each municipality (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). Growers 
of agricultural products, such as avocados, mangoes, and potatoes, established local associations (Mendoza, 
interview, 12/4/06).    35
with the state-controlled organism with the same name and the same members, such as in the 
case of AALPAUM, the Local Association of Avocado Producers of Uruapan, Michoacán
25 (Paz, 
interview, 11/27/06). 
Again, the state’s attempt to control local associations proved unsuccessful, but set in 
motion the development of an independent state avocado organization.
26 On September 27, 2004, 
the local avocado associations, more concerned with development of the industry than with 
politics, founded their own independent state umbrella commission, COMA, AC (Michoacán 
Avocado Commission). The idea was for associations to obtain their own resources, make their 
own decisions, and select their own members. For example, COMA is now working on a census 
of state growers that will be used to derive a yearly output and price forecast. In addition, it is 
working on setting up a collective brand and looking to market the brand at the national level, 
together with other organizations, such as PRO-AGUACATE. Even plant health boards and 
committees joined COMA.  
When the NAFTA negotiations commenced, a more sophisticated grower and exporter 
organization was needed.  The old ASEEAM, the association of packing-exporting companies 
that originated from the Foreign Trade Committee of Unión Agrícola Estatal (the  State 
Agriculture Union), was a good candidate. Since its formation in 1987, ASEEAM had been 
working to reduce the cost of exporting by signing collective contracts with the shipping 
industry, negotiating discount prices with the carton providers, and obtaining preferential 
contracts for harvesting services (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). However, ASEEAM also attempted 
to create barriers to the entry of new avocado exporters (Paz, interview, 11/27/06). That is, 
ASEEAM represented exporters’ interests, while leaving producers out, a situation difficult to 
accept for both state and agricultural ministry officials. It was determined that an entirely new 
organization should be set up, in which exporters held 75 percent of the vote and producers, 25 
percent, to conduct NAFTA negotiations on behalf of the avocado industry. The new 
organization was named the Avocado Commission (Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). 
                                                 
25 AALPAUM, a 40-year-old organization, was the second growers’ organization to emerge in the state. One of the 
original objectives was to defend property rights during times of uncertainty. Nowadays, the 100-member 
association provides technical assistance (on plant nutrition and diseases) to its members and conducts common 
purchases of inputs (Torres, interview, 8/22/06). 
26 Lázaro Cárdenas Batel, a PRD member, son of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and grandson of General Lázaro Cárdenas, 
won the 1992 state election. Lázaro Cárdenas Batel is the current governor of the state of Michoacán (2002-08). As 
for the local associations representing a diversity of products, only 5 percent of them remain active (Mendoza, 
interview, 12/4/06).   36
When the NAFTA negotiations were finished, and the USDA demanded the formation of 
a local organization to deal with certification expenses (see Section 7), the Avocado Commission 
was the favored candidate. But producers still held only 25 percent of the votes and they 
demanded an even 50-50 representation. When the exporters denied their petition, the producers 
left the Commission (Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). Facing a 9:00 am deadline the next day by 
which the organization was to be established, producers and exporters finally agreed (at 3:00 am) 
to create a new organization, APEAM, with a 50-50 voting representation for producers and 
exporters. APEAM was formed by two producers, Rito Mendoza and Gonzalo Moreno, and two 
exporters, Jorge Fernández Barragán (Agrifrut) and Ricardo Vega López, son of Don Leopoldo 
Vega (Grupo Purépecha). Most of the exporters that belonged to ASEEAM switched to APEAM 
(Paz, interview, 11/27/06). The exporters were able to impose an entrance fee for new exporters 
($160,000) as a contribution for what the organization had already accomplished (Paz, interview, 
11/27/06). 
  As mentioned in the previous section, APEAM’s main goal was to deal with the USDA 
on behalf of avocado producers and exporters, and to set up a collecting mechanism to pay for 
USDA permits (see Section 5). To pay for USDA certification documents, packing companies in 
Michoacán must provide APEAM $0.06 per kilogram exported to the United States. Beyond 
covering the USDA’s operating costs, APEAM provides the funding to promote consumption of 
Mexican avocados in the United States (television ads, trade fairs, tasting events, and so on). 
APEAM collects an extra $0.05 per kilogram exported from their packing plant members for 
promotional purposes. (That is, APEAM collects in total $0.11 per kilogram from packing plants 
to cover certification and promotion activities.) To date, APEAM has spent more than U.S. $7.5 
million on promotions (Scheidt, interview, 8/21/06).
27 Due to significantly increased exports, 
APEAM has a surplus of more than $10 million (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). APEAM members are 
debating how to utilize their excess funds, and are contemplating investment in research and 
development rather than short-term spending (Paz, interview, 9/5/06). 
Mexico’s new federal agricultural policy includes the establishment of System-Product 
National Committees (Comité Nacional Sistema-Producto), or S-P Committees.  These 
committees are a national forum to bring together representatives or associates of the firms 
                                                 
27 In addition, the federal government matched APEAM funds for promotion through ASERCA (SAGARPA). To 
date, the federal government has contributed a total of U.S. $4.0 million (Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06).   37
involved in the production and marketing processes of specific products. S-P National 
Committees are formed by committees at the state level.
28 Committees at both the national and 
state levels are headed by government and non-government officials. For example, the avocado 
S-P National Committee brings together the avocado S-P State Committees from Michoacán, 
Nayarit, Puebla, Mexico, and Nuevo León.
29 Michoacán’s avocado S-P State Committee, 
CESIPRO (Comité Estatal del Sistema-Producto Aguacate), brings together nurseries, 
producers, pickers, packers, transport companies, avocado-processing firms, business chambers, 
and other service providers. Michoacán accounts for 90 percent of the avocado business, as 
mentioned (Zamora, interview, 12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). 
The main goal of the S-P Committees is to map out the direction of the industry through a 
Strategic Plan. There is one Strategic Plan at the state level and one at the federal level. Any 
action must be laid out in the plans in order to gain support from the federal and state 
governments. This provides an incentive to all associations to meet and draw up short and long-
term plans. The federal government grants up to U.S. $45,450 annually over a period of three 
years to cover the costs of drafting the plans. So far, the avocado S-P Committees have identified 
80 projects.
30 The S-P Committee strategy does have some shortcomings. First, the committees 
do not have legal status, and the decisions agreed upon are not enforceable (Zamora, interview, 
12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). Second, not all industry-related associations take part in 
the committees. For example, the National Association of Wholesale Markets, the National 
Association of Supermarkets and Department Stores (Walmart, Comercial Mexicana, HEB, and 
so on), and APEAM itself, that is the Association of Producers and Exporters of Avocado from 
Michoacán, are not members (Zamora, interview, 12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). Lastly, 
key avocado exporters do not always agree with the resolutions of S-P Committees, such as on 
                                                 
28 In Michoacán there are S-P State Committees for products such as avocados, coconuts, mangoes, guavas, 
potatoes, strawberries, sorghum, wheat, and so on (Zamora, interview, 12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). 
29 Avocado growers even founded a new association to represent them in the S-P National Committees: CONAPA, 
or Consejo Nacional de Productores de Aguacate (the National Board of Avocado Growers) (Zamora, interview, 
12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06). 
30 Among the projects identified in the plans are: construction of cold room facilities; updating technology in 
nurseries; building new packing facilities; learning about how to maximize fruit production (with the support of 
Michoacán State University and Chapingo University); using different seeds, according to the climate and soil 
conditions; establishing integral pruning packages (smaller trees to reduce harvesting, watering, and spraying 
expenses); taking trips to Peru to identify potential competitors; publishing current research before it becomes 
obsolete; developing a database with types of climate and soil per orchard; creating mathematical forecasting 
models; and further supporting efforts to confront multinational corporations (business vision, improved production 
techniques, own brands, packing plants, and exports) (Zamora, interview, 12/4/06; Mendoza, interview, 12/4/06).   38
the construction of more packing plants and at times simply do not comprehend the benefits of 
an S-P policy (Vega, interview, 8/23/06). 
  Associations of producers, packing plants, and service providers have played a key role 
in the promotion and dissemination of information about exporting activities and other 
production issues. Some of these associations are: PRO-AGUACATE, SUMA (Servicios Unidos 
en Materia Agrícola – harvesting services); CESIPO (harvesting group); SOCOAAI (Sociedad 
cooperativa Agrícola de Cupatitzio); AMIMEX (Aguacateros de Michoacán, México); 
CONASIPRO; and UEAP, AC, Unión de Empacadores de Aguacate de Peribán.  
 
10) Counterfactual: Mangoes, Too Sweet, Too Cheap 
 
Most interviewers mentioned mangoes as the counterfactual case for avocados. Many 
interviewees mentioned attempting and failing to export mangoes. (Paz, interview, 9/5/06; 
Villaseñor, interview, 8/23/06; Perfino, interview, 8/22/06; Ortiz, interview, 12/4/06). Even the 
current president of the State Board of Plant Health (Comité Estatal de Sanidad Vegetal), Mr. 
José Luis Gallardo is transforming his company, Anguiano’s Mango Plantations, into avocado 
orchards (Perfino, interview, 8/22/06). But why is it difficult for multinational corporations to 
succeed at exporting mangoes? Compared with avocados, mango exports seem to have failed 
because of their (1) short life; (2) dispersed producers; (3) lack of production controls; (4) the 
expensive infrastructure required for pest elimination; (5) unenforceable grower-exporter 
contracts; and (6) lack of industry organization. 
Compared with the avocado, the short life of the mango makes the jobs of the producers 
and packing companies more difficult. Avocado trees can maintain fresh fruit up to six months 
once it is ready; mango trees hold the fruit for less than a week. Producers then have to be ready 
to sell the fruit to packing plants that in turn need to process it and sell it rapidly in international 
markets. They must accept the current price (Paz, interview, 9/5/06; Ortiz, interview, 12/4/06). 
Prices can easily drop as whole mango regions come into full production. In addition, Mexico’s 
mango market is small, unlike its market for avocados, which makes it difficult for producers 
and packers to recover lost revenues by releasing surplus quantities into the market.
31 
                                                 
31 A possible solution would be to find a way to keep mangoes fresh during the final export stages, before they reach 
the consumer; this is the case for kiwis and apples, which once harvested can be stored for months (Paz, interview, 
11/21/04).   39
In contrast to avocados, there are several mango producing regions in Mexico. The main 
mango producers are the states of Nayarit, Guerrero, Colima, and Michoacán (Torres, interview, 
8/22/06). The season starts in the southern states of Chiapas and Oaxaca and ends in Sinaloa in 
Central West Mexico. This means that packing plants in each region are only active two months 
per year, making investment in packing plants unprofitable, and pests hard to control. Some have 
attempted establishing their packing operations in a more central location, such as Guadalajara, 
with little success (Paz, interview, 9/5/06).  
Avocado producers and exporters from Michoacán comply with norms, while mangoes 
that are produced in a diversity of regions lack operation and quality controls. While avocado 
production procedures have been standardized and pesticides and chemicals controlled, mango 
operations do not have standardized procedures that would secure the same quality levels 
throughout the harvesting months in each region and across plantations (Ortiz, interview, 
12/4/06).  
The most common mango disease that threatens exports is eliminated by treating the fruit 
with hot water, right at the packing plant (Paz, interview, 11/21/06). This process damages the 
fruit and adds sufficient additional cost to the packing companies’ bottom line that it renders 
mango processing unprofitable. The cost of pest control efforts for mango production has been 
shared by producers (cleaning, pruning, and spraying) and packing companies (harvesting, 
transporting, and managing). 
  Multinational corporations, such as Calavo, have an annual business plan to follow, with 
specific export volumes to meet. Calavo found it difficult to comply with its mango export 
program because although agreements had been reached with producers, they often would not 
honor the contracts (Ortiz, interview, 12/4/06). In other words, contracts are not enforceable. For 
example, close to the harvest day, the grower would receive offers from outside (American) 
firms that would pay slightly above what Calavo had agreed for the purchase price in the 
contract. When Calavo would arrive to pick up the fruit, it would be gone. “Contract agreements 
in the Mexican countryside do not mean much.” (Ortiz, interview, 12/4/06) In the case of 
avocados, an outside firm can not simply come, buy the product, and export it to the United 
States. Only packing companies certified by both the plant health boards and committees and the 
USDA are able to export. Regarding other markets, it is unlikely that French or Japanese buyers 
would show up at avocado orchards to buy the fruit. However, avocado producers are free to sell   40
the fruit to the domestic market when the price is right, where shortages can set the domestic 
price at higher levels than the international going rate.
32 
Mango producers are not as organized as avocado producers are. The producers do not 
even participate in EMEX, the mango organization that covers the expenses of the USDA 
inspectors (the equivalent of APEAM in the avocado industry). That is, “mango packing plants 
look out only for their own individual interest” (Perfino, interview, 8/22/06). For avocados, the 
organization of producers was essential, not only to eradicate pests and isolate the production 
region against potential phytosanitary threats, but also to keep prices stable. 
Lastly, it seems that some mango producers and packers are involved in money 
laundering (Paz, interview, 9/5/06), buying the fruit at high prices and selling it cheap, eroding 
margins and making the mango business unattractive for potential new investors. In the avocado 
export industry, most producers and exporters know each other, and organizations such as 
APEAM are constantly monitoring the prices in the United States with representatives stationed 
there. If an exporter is selling at a lower price than the rest (dumping or money laundering), it 
will soon be detected. 
 
11) Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
Michoacán’s soil, climate, and rainfall provide adequate conditions for avocado growing. Other 
Mexican states such as Puebla and Jalisco also grow avocados, but only Michoacán growers 
have been able to set up large-scale export operations. Today, Michoacán exports 90 percent of 
all avocado exports from Mexico and Mexican exports represent 40 percent of the world’s 
exports, or approximately $400 million per year. Local growers obtain two-thirds of this sum and 
exporters and service providers (harvesting, sanitary fees, and transportation) the rest. Importers 
and retailers abroad generate another $400 million a year in their home country. That is, nearly 
50 percent of the final value added of avocados remains in Michoacán. In addition, this export 
activity has promoted the development of other services, such as harvesting and cold chain 
systems, and the development of other manufacturing activities, such as guacamole (avocado 
paste), avocado oil, and cosmetics. 
                                                 
32 Avocados in Monterrey, Mexico were sold to the final consumer at $4.00/kg, while the price in Japan was 
$3.00/kg during the same period. Monterrey even had to import avocados from California during fall 2006 (Ricardo 
Vega, interview, 8/23/06).   41
The first formal avocado exports from Mexico took place in 1970, when Don Leopoldo 
Vega, owner of Purepecha Group (a first mover),  sent two containers (about 40 tons) to 
Rotterdam. This operation had little diffusion due to Don Leopoldo’s policy of not having 
business partners. For this reason, the next exporters, which got involved ten years later, are also 
considered first movers. They were the members of the Socopaum cooperative, which started 
exporting to France in 1980. Their export motivation responded to: (1) a FIRA report that the 
local market would soon be saturated; (2) the 1983 fall of Israeli avocado production; (3) high 
prices in France and Rotterdam; and (4) because “it was fashionable.” Contacts with both an 
Israeli exporter and an Israeli manufacturer of packing plants provided the means to learn about 
export markets and new technologies. 
Initially, the dissemination of export know-how was conducted by Socopaum first 
movers, transnational corporations, and the workers themselves. Because first movers needed 
partners to set up modern packing plants (a nearly $2 million investment), growers got together 
and formed cooperatives or associations, sometimes inviting friends or relatives from the 
region.
33 When the first movers formed new firms, export know-how was disseminated to their 
new partners. Associations with foreign firms (Calavo, Mission, Fresh-Directions) brought the 
discipline of quality control and the new harvesting and packing processes needed by local firms 
to go into large-scale operations. Lastly, local workers, who moved frequently from one 
company to another, knew how to select avocados, operate and fix American and Israeli 
machinery, and find orchards that had avocados with the features demanded by foreign clients. 
The paper identified several market failures during the first export and dissemination 
processes. For example, several public goods were generated in the region, such as improved 
avocado varieties that were resistant to cold weather; regions in Michoacán that were declared 
disease-free and export certified; and a pool of workers who moved from company to company. 
Exporters enjoyed some positive externalities generated by the government, such as the free 
distribution of avocados in the 1960s, creating with time a diversity of avocado growers (14,000 
growers), which were enough to provide the product for the local and export markets. 
Promotional support was provided through a federal matching fund of $4 million and the direct 
involvement of BANCOMEXT, the foreign trade support bank. Asymmetric information 
                                                 
33 First movers also realized that sharing the risk of export failures, due to the perishable feature of the avocado, was 
necessary, especially during the early trial and error phase of long-distance avocado transportation.   42
problems generated between growers’ potential expansion plans and private banks were resolved 
through a branch of the Mexican Central Bank, FIRA, which provided collateral to private banks 
and technical assistance to growers. Lastly, coordination failures generated by the need to follow 
strict measures to prevent the spread of disease in orchards and packing plants were dealt with 
through the formation of APEAM, and the work of the public-private state and municipal Juntas 
and Committees of Sanidad Vegetal. 
A diversity of government agencies participated in the development of the avocado 
export industry. At the federal level, support was provided by federal banks, through the 
Ministries of Agriculture and Economics, and through the recent System-Product Committees. 
Bancomext and FIRA provided loans to growers and exporters at discounted rates and provided 
both technical assistance and export information (market trends, fair space, meeting 
arrangements for potential clients, and so on). The Ministry of Agriculture oversaw compliance 
with phytosanitary standards through the state and municipal Juntas and Committees of Sanidad 
Vegetal, a public-private organization. The Ministry of Economics took the lead regarding the 
NAFTA negotiations on avocado exports and the establishment of quality norms, with which 
compliance is obligatory for exporters. Lastly, the avocado System-Product Committee 
integrated participants in the avocado production, marketing, and export chain. The Committee 
identifies key projects for the industry, and whenever federal and state governments wish to 
provide their support, it must be to one of the projects already identified by the Committee as a 
priority.  
  The government met the needs of the avocado growers and exporters, except for two 
issues. First, compliance with the norm is monitored by the state and local Juntas and 
Committees of Sanidad Vegetal and not by independent consultants as was originally intended. 
Giving the Juntas and Committees norm compliance and phytosanitary control meant they were 
able to regulate the supply of avocados. Second, the System-Product Committees did not seem to 
work well for two reasons. First, key members in the chain have not been integrated, such as the 
powerful avocado growers and exporters association, APEAM; the national association of 
warehouses; and the national association of retailers (Walmart, HEB, Soriana, Comercial 
Mexicana, and so on). The System-Product Committees do not have a legal structure; therefore, 
the commitments made by participants are not mandatory.   43
Local organizations played a key role in shaping the avocado industry. After a period of 
uncertain land ownership and political cooptation, organizations focused on specific tasks, such 
as the eradication of disease, compliance with USDA fees, forming a credit union, access to the 
U.S. market, and so on. Some organizations, like the Juntas and Committees of Sanidad Vegetal 
and the System-Product Committees, are run by public-private entities. The most relevant 
organization today is perhaps APEAM, the association of growers and exporters that work with 
the USDA to ensure compliance with phytosanitary regulations. APEAM collects $0.11 (recently 
reduced to $0.07) per kilogram exported to the United States to pay for the USDA inspectors and 
for promotions in the United States. APEAM also charges $160,000 to new exporters seeking 
access to the U.S. market. This approximates the level of cost the first exporters to the United 
States had to pay, that is, to “internalize the externalities.” 
Regarding the counterfactual, the case of mango exports sheds some light on the factors 
that have made avocado exports successful. First, having a harvest season 4-6 months long 
provides avocado producers and packing companies with an advantage over other agricultural 
products: supply can be regulated throughout the year. Second, the standardization and 
regulation of avocado selection and classification has been key to provide the international 
market with a consistent product, even when the fruit comes from dozens of different producers 
throughout the year. Third, distributing the cost of pest control to producers and packing 
companies during year-long operations has diffused the cost and allowed all production chains to 
continue to be profitable. Fourth, having a restricted number of buyers for exports allows the 
avocado industry to avoid the risk of confronting outside firms with short-term views. Finally, 
the industry participants are a tight-knit group in Michoacán, which has helped to mitigate the 
entrance of money laundering operations in a state that, on the whole, is highly permeated by 
organized crime. 
Avocado trends for Michoacán growers and exporters look good for the short term and 
uncertain for the longer term. In February 2007, Mexican exporters were able to export avocados 
to all U.S. states, for an expected 20 percent increase in avocado exports. The medium and 
longer terms seem more complex. On the one hand, market conditions in the avocado industry 
are getting tougher. For example, the Eurogap norm requires that orchards exporting to Europe 
comply with a set of food security, innocuous, ecological, and social security regulations. 
Although the Juntas and Committees of Sanidad Vegetal oversee some of these issues, not all   44
Eurogap regulations have been covered by current procedures. It is likely that other countries, 
such as Japan, will follow the European example. This would put exporters in a difficult position 
because it would require a commitment from the growers. On the other hand, new entrants such 
as Peru, with state-of-the-art technology and favorable soil and climate conditions, will put 
pressure on Mexican growers and exporters not only in the international market, but in the 
domestic market as well. 
 
Policy Recommendations to Increase the Pace of Discovery 
 
The case of avocados shows that the way to let the public sector know about the market failures 
that slow the pace of discovery is to let the private sector direct public organizations. In the case 
of Michoacán, public officials and local growers run the Juntas and Committees of Sanidad 
Vegetal, which were able to eliminate disease and certify the exports of avocados in some 
regions.  
However, groups within the private sector must be equally represented. In the case of 
APEAM, the association of avocado growers and exporters to the U.S. market, both growers and 
exporters have 50 percent of the votes. The counterfactual, EMEX, the mango exporting 
organization that works with the USDA, is formed only by exporters, omitting growers, who in 
turn have been blamed for not honoring their contracts with exporters. 
Lastly, the organization must have a legal structure. The System-Product Committee for 
avocados brings together the participants of the production, marketing, and export chain of the 
avocado industry. However, although the Committees consist of official and unofficial members, 
the lack of a legal structure makes their agreements unenforceable. 
   45
Bibliography  
 
1)  Books and Articles 
 
Aguilar, C. 2003. Sistema Nacional de Innovación: Una aproximación teórica para la 
agricultura: El caso del cultivo de aguacate. Michoacán, Universidad Tecnológica de la 
Mixteca, Temas, May-August. 
AGEXPRONT. 2004. Estudio de oportunidad de negocios sobre el aguacate. Guatemala: Depto. 
de Información de Mercados. 
Asociación Agrícola Local de Productores de Aguacate de Uruapan Michoacán. From 
http://www.aproam.com/CULTIVO/produccion.htm. 
Bellamore, T. 2002. “Mexican Avocados: History…The Full Story.” California Avocado Society 
Yearbook 86: 51-57. 
Comité Estatal Sanidad Vegetal, Michoacán. Informe Bianaual del Comité Estatal de Sanidad 
Vegetal de Michoacán (March, 2004 to February, 2006). SAGARPA, Gobierno del 
Estado de Michoacán. 
Contreras-Castillo, J-M. 1999. “La competitividad de las exportaciones Mexicanas de aguacate: 
Un análisis cuantitativo.” Revista Chapingo Serie Horticultura 6: 393-400. 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT). 2000-2004. Agriculture 
Statistics. September 2006. From http://faostat.fao.org. 
_____.  2007. FAO Dirección de Estadistica. 
Morales, J.L., L. Estrada, and M. Gutiérrez. El cultivo del aguacate en Michoacán, 25 años de 
investigación del M.C., Ramón Martínez Barrera. México: Facultad de Agrobiología, 
Universidad Michoacana.  
Orden, D. 1994. “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The 
Legal Texts, GATT Secretariat.” Mexico-U.S. Avocado Trade Expansion, World Trade 
Organization. Geneva, Switzerland. 
Téliz, D. 2000. El aguacate y su manejo integrado. Mexico: Ediciones Mundi-Prensa. 
Salazar, S., L. Zamora and R. Vega-López. 2004-05. “Update on the Avocado Industry of 
Michoacán, México.” California Avocado Society Yearbook 87: 31-44. 
   46
Zamora, M., J. Bontemps-Cajuste, and S. Colina-León. 1999. “Efecto de los daños mecánicos 
sobre el comportamiento postcosecha del fruto de aguacate.” Revista Chapingo Serie 




Doddoli Villaseñor, Humberto, Owner, Agribusiness Azteca (harvesting firm), and Presidente, 
Servicios Unidos en Materia Agrícola (SUMA), August 22, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Doddoli, Guido, Owner, Avoking (Guacamole firm), August 22, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Fernandez B., Jorge, President, Asociación de Productores y Empacadores de Aguacate de 
Michoacán, A.C, (APEAM), and Owner, AgriFrut (packing plant), August 21, 2006; 
Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Guillard, Charles, Owner oil manufacturing plant, August 23, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Morales Sierra, Jorge, Gerente; Unión de Empacadores de Michoacán (UDECAM), August 21, 
2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Padilla, Andrei, Co-owner, Compra y Venta de Aguacate, August 22, 2006, Uruapan, 
Michoacán. 
Paz Vega, Ramón, Managing Director, Coliman Group, International Business Unit (consulting 
firm), former grower, packer, and ex-partner of Fresh Directions, September 5, 2006, 
Monterrey, Nuevo León. 
________________, Managing Director, Coliman Group, International Business Unit; 
(consulting firm), former grower, packer, and ex-partner of Fresh Directions, November 
21, 2006, Monterrey, Nuevo León. 
________________, Managing Director, Coliman Group, International Business Unit; 
(consulting firm), former grower, packer, and ex-partner of Fresh Directions, November 
27, 2006, Monterrey, Nuevo León. 
Perfino Mejía, José G., Gerente General, Comité Estatal de Sanidad Vegetal en Michoacán 
(public-private regulation agency), August 22, 2006; Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Rivas, Mario A., Owner, Global Fruit (packing plant), August 21, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Scheidt, Marcos, Director General, Asociación de Productores y Empacadores de Aguacate de 
Michoacán, A.C. (APEAM), August 21, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán.   47
Torres Corona, Salvador, Gerente Técnico, Asociación Agrícola Local de Productores de 
Aguacate de Uruapan, Michoacán (AALPAUM), August 22, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Vega Esquivel, Leopoldo, Presidente, Grupo Purepecha Corporativo Hass Avocados (packing 
plant and grower), December 5, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Vega López, Ricardo F., Gerente General, Frutícola Velo (packing plant), August 23, 2006, 
Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Villaseñor, Antonio, Owner, Aztecavo (packing plant), August 23, 2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
_________________, Owner, Aztecavo (packing plant), December 5, 2006, Uruapan, 
Michoacán. 
Villaseñor Zurita, Antonio, Director de Comercialización, Aztecavo (packing plant), August 23, 
2006, Uruapan, Michoacán. 
Zamora, C., Manager and Facilitator, Comité Nacional Sistema-Producto, December 4, 2006, 
Uruapan, Michoacán.   48
Acronyms 
 
AALPAUM  Local Association of Avocado Producers of Uruapan, Michoacán 
Agrexco Israeli  firm  name 
Aguamich Aguacates  Michoacanos 
APEAM  Association of Producers and Exporters of Avocado from Michoacán   
APHIS   Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
ASEEAM  Business Association of Avocado Exporters of Michoacán 
Banamex  National Bank of Mexico 
Bancomext  Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior 
CEO    Chief Executive Officer 
CESIPRO  Comité Estatal del Sistema-Producto Aguacate 
CNOP   Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares 
COMA Michoacán  Avocado  Commission 
CONAFRUT  National Commission of Fruit Growing 
Dovi   Company  name 
EMEX   Mexican association of mango exporters that organize USDA services 
FIRA   Fideicomisos  Integrados  Relacionados con la Agricultura 
IMCE    Mexican Institute of Foreign Trade 
INIFAP  Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agrícolas y Pecuarias 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
NGO     Nongovernmental organization 
Nuca   New  California 
SAGARPA  Ministry of Agriculture 
SCL    Limited Liability Corporation 
Socoaac  Sociedad Cooperativa de Agricultores de Aguacate del Cupatitzio 
SOCOAAI  Sociedad Cooperativa Agrícola de Cupatitzio 
Socopaum Firm  name 
SPS    Sanitary and phytosanitary 
SUMA   Harvesting Firms Association 
UDECAM  Michoacán Avocado Packers’ Union 
UEAP   Unión de Empacadores de Aguacate de Peribán 
USDA   U.S. Department of Agriculture  
Vifrut   Company  name 
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II. Medical Equipment: Catheters 
 
Medical equipment is an industry that has boomed in the past five years in the United States and 
other developed countries. The increase in sales is closely related to discoveries and advances in 
medicine and health care services. Health care and related industries include health care services, 
pharmaceuticals, government hospitals, drugstores, medical equipment and supplies, and health 
insurance providers. Although biotechnology has played a main role in the life sciences field, 
other related products such as mechanical equipment have had an increase in demand in the past 
decade.  
Employment has declined in the United States, whereas the health sector grew by about 
1.7 million jobs between 2000 and 2005. An interesting point about this growth is that medical 
equipment and supplies, as part of the health sector, added no jobs in this period. This might be 
because large consortiums producing medical equipment have moved to other countries, where 
the medical technology sector has positioned itself as a stable engine of innovation and economic 
growth. The successful commercialization of new medical devices has fostered new investment 
and also venture capital. From 2004 to mid-2006, 44 medical technology companies in the 
United States completed initial public offerings. In addition to the mergers and acquisitions that 
have continued their usual activity in the sector, a main target of the larger medical technology 
companies is small companies located in the United States and in countries like Mexico. 
Besides the fact that the lifespan of a venture capital fund is 10 years, investors seek regions 
that can create and sustain a healthy venture-investment environment. Two of the strongest 
regions in the United States are Northern and Southern California, which possess some of the 
elements that help to create a critical mass to reduce investment risk: 
 
•  Strong infrastructure including capital and professional services 
•  Entrepreneurial culture supported by local government 
•  Large established companies from which firms can recruit talent and expertise 
•  University communities that support research and provide the knowledge base 
for innovations. 
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Despite good prospects, the medical equipment industry faces a number of challenges 
that affect companies inside and outside the United States. The challenges are related to pricing, 
expansion of global markets, industry consolidation, and evolving regulatory requirements. 
 
Regulation. American medical equipment firms have to fulfill the Federal Drug Agency (FDA) 
regulations. Some of them are very complex and imply high costs, affecting smaller companies 
more.  
Reimbursement. A large consumer of medical equipment and services, such as a prestigious 
medical center, can affect the level of market prices according to the amount that they are willing 
to pay. Therefore, when small companies launch a product, they have to look for the best 
channels of commercialization.  
Consolidation. In the past years, the tendency has been for large companies to merge, and small 
ones to remain independent. This has generated a need for financing and driven down overall 
returns.  
 
1)  Medical Equipment Exports in Mexico 
 
For classification purposes, the term “medical instruments” or “medical devices” has a broad 
definition. According to the Global Harmonization Task Force, a medical device (9018) is any 
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, appliance, implant, in vitro reagent or calibrator, 
software, material or other similar or related article intended by the manufacturer to be used, 
alone or in combination, for human beings for one or more of the specific purposes of: 
 
•  Diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment, or alleviation of disease 
•  Diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury 
•  Investigation, replacement, modification, or support of the anatomy 
•  Physiological processes 
•  Supporting or sustaining life 
•  Birth control 
•  Disinfection of medical devices 
•  Provision of information for medical purposes by means of in vitro 
examination of specimens derived from the human body and which does not 
achieve its primary intended action in or on the human body by   51
pharmacological, immunological, or metabolic means, but which may be 
assisted in its function by such means. 
 
There are two types of medical equipment producers in Mexico: those that produce short-
use devices such as disposable rubber gloves, and those that produce long-use mechanical 
devices such as catheters for heart valves. Most of the major firms produce several devices in at 
least three or four families of products. This means that a firm must have a wide variety of 
production processes. In order to reduce costs, medical equipment consortiums are organized in 
divisions according to their products. Such groups are distributed in different countries, with cost 
reduction being the main criterion for allocation. The medical equipment industry does not imply 
direct contact with the final consumer; demand for a specific product or device is generated by 
the medical procedure or treatment. The physician or hospital department requests the product 
from a medical equipment distributor that has a commercial relationship with the producer. The 
main producers of medical equipment devices are well-organized, large corporations with a long 
tradition in the industry. The headquarters send specific requirements to the appropriate division 
to produce the supply. Sometimes a device is a new product or requires a new design that leads 
to a discovery or innovation. The corporations have research and development departments with 
high technology to supply this kind of demand. Once the design is developed, the production 
process is implemented in the factory. Three phases characterize the production of medical 
equipment, as shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  

















In Mexico, annual exports of medical instruments (9018) increased from U.S. $394.4 
million in 1995 to U.S. $ 2,967.1 million in 2005. Figure 6 shows the 6-digit medical products 
that had the largest increases in exports. These are 901839, catheter (sonda) T-kehr; 901890, 
other instruments and appliances for medical surgical, deontological, and veterinary uses; and 
901819, other electro-diagnostic apparatus, except electro-cardiographs. Catheter T-kehr had the 
largest export value at U.S. $ 1,999,916 <check value and units, thousands?> in 2004. At the 8-
digit level, the products under 90183999 classifications represented 57 percent of the total 
amount. The products in this classification are a wide diversity of catheters, from very standard 
devices, such as a simple plastic tube, to a very sophisticated catheter with a laser included.    53
Figure 6. 































Catheters, (T kehr) cannulae and the like 




Magnetic resonance imaging apparatus
Scintigraphic apparatus
Other electro-diagnostic apparatus, except electro-cardiographs
Ultraviolet or infrared ray apparatus, and parts and accessories 
Syringes, with or without their needles:
Tubular metal needles and needles for sutures
Dental equipment with stand.
Other instruments and odontologic devices
Other ophthalmic instruments and appliances
 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
   
2)  Antecedents in the Production of Medical Equipment and Services in Mexico 
 
The production of medical products in Mexico existed well before the arrival of the Spaniards. 
Traditional medicine was a very common practice for the indigenous groups settled in the 
Mesoamerican region. This tradition continued during the Colonial Period and after 
Independence in the eighteenth century. Around 1930 some companies from the United States 
that were producing medical products, mainly medicines, were established in Mexico as 
subsidiaries of U.S. headquarters. One of them was Merck Sharp & Dohme, which was, at the   54
beginning of 1900, a small affiliate of a German producer of chemical substances. By 1932 the 
Mexican firm worked as a distributor but by 1950, after important discoveries in this branch of 
medicine, the company started to produce hydrocortisone and dexametason, substances that were 
used in Mexico.  
The medical product industry and medical services started to grow after the creation in 
1943 of the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS, the Medical Insurance Institute of 
Mexico), a tripartite institution (government, business, and workers) that provides medical 
services for everyone who has a formal job. The IMSS is one of three health care systems in 
Mexico. The second is the Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del 
Estado (ISSSTE, Medical Insurance for Government Workers), which offers medical services 
such as workers’ compensation for the federal government’s workers. The third system is run by 
the Health Secretariat, the Secretaria de Salud y Asistencia Publica (SSA), which provides public 
health care services for people in the informal sector, the unemployed, and the poor. In addition, 
private medical providers work with private health insurance; these services are usually very 
expensive. 
All these health care systems have a whole infrastructure of hospitals, clinics, and 
medical offices that require medical equipment such as hospital beds and other sophisticated 
devices. Nonetheless, most Mexican medical equipment companies were distributors, and even 
producers depended on foreign companies for inputs. That dependence was an obstacle to growth 
and expansion as a national industrial sector. 
 
3)  Key Reasons for Choosing Mexico to Produce or Manage Medical Equipment  
 
In contrast to many other Latin American countries, Mexico has had a stable political and social 
environment in the past years. Although in 1995 Mexico suffered one of the worst economic 
crises of the twentieth century, the federal government made a huge effort to rescue the key 
economic activities.  
  When it opened to international trade in 1986, Mexico changed from a highly protected 
economy to one of the countries with many trade agreements. Some critical phenomena 
regarding international trade have characterized the Mexican economy. 
  The reduction of tariffs and restrictions benefited firms that where prepared for the 
international market, most of them being large consortiums with monopolistic characteristics.   55
Large companies such as Telmex, the main and for a long time sole provider of telephone 
services in Mexico, and CEMEX, one of the two main providers of cement in Mexico, took 
advantage of the new conditions set in the international trade agreements. 
On the other side, small and medium firms that were not prepared for international 
competition had their market participation reduced or lost completely. Some had to close and 
others survived but suffered serious financial problems. The increase in demand for urban 
services and products, a consequence of the population concentration in urban areas and of some 
monetary strategies, required a supply that the Mexican firms were unable to provide. The main 
Mexican firms were concentrated in a few specific products and the rest, which accounted for 
more than 92 percent of the firms, were unorganized and inefficient. 
  Conditions were prepared for foreign firms to produce what the Mexican consumers 
required. With the incorporation of Mexico into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
federal government undertook a very aggressive policy to attract foreign investment. During the 
decade from 1975 to 1985, Mexico had been a very attractive country for investment, given the 
oil discoveries on the Gulf of Mexico; however, restrictions on international trade were still 
effective. Once tariffs and barriers started to be reduced, foreign investors considered Mexico as 
an attractive option. At the same time, indirect investment was accepted under very flexible 
conditions, and short-term capital arrived in the country, producing an increase in demand and 
creating a false illusion of monetary power.  
Around 1990, the number of foreign firms arriving increased, some to supply the deficit 
in production by Mexican producers, some looking for new markets. The Mexican government, 
at the federal and state levels, helped the foreign firms to build industrial parks and provided 
them with facilities and promotions such as temporary tax exemptions. The maquila regime that 
had started decades before was the perfect framework for the establishment of foreign firms, 
mainly along the border between Mexico and the United States, most of them belonging to 
American consortiums. 
The foreign firms gained cost reductions by hiring the cheap labor force. And some of the 
foreign firms took advantage of the relatively flexible regulations in the use of dangerous inputs 
or production processes that caused environmental contamination.   56
Some of the first firms that were established in Mexico in the medical equipment sector 
used plastic or silicon as inputs. At the time, those inputs were not subject to technological 
controls to reduce pollution at a low cost. 
The first firms producing medical equipment were established in Baja California. This 
state is located in the extreme northwestern part of Mexico, sharing the border with the U.S. state 
of California. The economies of the Mexican city of Tijuana and the U.S. city of San Diego had 
been tied for centuries. Both share similar natural resources and an ancestral culture and 
traditions. In spite of the differences in language and level of development, both cities comprise 
an economic region and are complementary to each other. 
For years Tijuana was the Mexican border city with the most firms under the maquila 
regime. It had good road infrastructure for connecting with San Diego, and therefore with Los 
Angeles, California. Tijuana attracted many American corporations that wanted to take 
advantage of the tax exemptions and the cheap labor force. To enjoy Mexican privileges and at 
the same time be close to their main distribution centers was an excellent opportunity that many 
firms took. 
Around 1980 some firms producing medical equipment were established in Tijuana. Most 
of them were small factories using simple production processes. The corporate headquarters 
were located in the U.S. state of California, a few hours drive from the production plants. 
Supervision was an important factor in monitoring directly the whole process that some devices 
required. To be close was a key factor for the U.S. managers that in this way kept quality under 
control. 
As the maquila firms increased in number, Baja California state authorities started to 
provide legal and infrastructure conditions in order to attract more firms and retain those that 
provided many jobs. A flow of immigrants started to move to Tijuana; some of this population 
saw the city as a step toward the United States, and the maquila companies provided them a 
short-term way to survive. The cheap and abundant labor force reinforced the attraction of 
Tijuana as a maquila city.  
In the specific case of the production of catheters, Table 2 lists some of the most 
important firms according to their year of arrival. 
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Table 2. 
Main Catheter Producers in Baja California 
 
TIJUANA 







Dime-Pack  S.de R.L de 
C.V. (ONIX IND) 
2000  USA  228  Assembly and packaging of  
surgical products 
Coastline de México, 
S.A. de C.V. 
1993  USA  230  Medical products  (staple 
guns for veins and arteries),  
electronics (coils and 
boards) 
Block Medical de 
Mexico, S.A. de C.V. 
1993 USA  250 Assembly  and  manufacture 
of portable plastic bombs 
for serum application, 
disposable antibiotics and 
accessories for plastic 
bombs 
Del Mar Biotecnología 
S.A. de C.V. (Integra 
Biotechnical) 
1997  USA  300  Assembly and packaging of 
medical products for 
hospitals and laboratories 
(catheters and plastic 
pipettes) 
NPA de México, S.A. 
de C.V. 
2001  USA  380  Assembly of medical 
products 
Smiths Healthcare 
Manufacturing, S.A. de 
C.V. 
1996 U.K  500 Manufacture  of  medical 
products 
Medimexico S. de R.L. 
de C.V. 
1993 USA  550 Disposable  medical 
products 
Ensatec S.A. de C.V. 
(Pall Medical) 
1983 USA  600 Manufacture  of  medical 
filters 
Sistemas Médicos 
Alaris, S.A. de C.V. 
1997 USA  600 Medical  assembly 
Medtronic México, S. 
de R.L. de C.V. 
1998  USA 1000 Manufacture  and  assembly 
of catheters for vascular 
uses 
Pacific Device de 
México S.A. de C.V. 
1993  USA 1500 Bags  for  surgical  waste, 
white coats and catheters 
Tayco  Healthcare  1985  USA 1800 Surgical  equipment 
Nellcore Purittan Bennet 
México S.A. de C.V. 
(Tyco Nellcore 
Healthcare) 
1996  USA 2232 Catheters,  oxisensors,  urinal 
bags, surgical products, 
scissors and syringes 
   58
 
ENSENADA 
Firm First  year  of 
operation 
Investor country  Number of 
employees 
Products 
BMP de México, 
S.A. de C.V. 




S.A. de C.V. 







Firm First  year  of 
operation 









1992 USA 270  Medical  products 
 
TECATE 
Firm First  year  of 
operation 




México S.A. de 
C.V. (from Tyco 
Healthcare) 
1995 USA 30  Manufacture  of 
medical products 
Industrias Hudson, 
S.A. de C.V. 
2002 USA 270  End  tracheal  tubes 
and catheters 
   Source: Baja California StateGovernment State, Secretariat of Economic Development, 2005. 
 
Some economic characteristics of Baja California have fostered the activities of the medical 
equipment cluster. Some of the most important are: 
 
•  Economic activity in Baja has increased in concentration. Fifty percent of the 
gross value added from the 2003 Economic Census decreased from 39 
economic sectors in 1998 to 27 in 2003. 
•  Of all the priority clusters in Baja California, at least four coincide with those 
in the city of San Diego. 
•  There are programs that seek to improve the level of higher education 
•  A high percentage of the population is between 20 and 30 years of age, the 
most productive stage.   59
•  The state government supports the legal structure to promote urban 
development. 
•  Baja California has four local divisions (municipalities), each of which has its 
own urban development plan. 
•  There is a good land-use plan for regulating the installation of factories.  
 
4)  Characteristics of the First Mover and Some Followers 
 
4.1. The First Mover: Nellcore Puritan Bennet Mexico 
The main medical equipment producers are part of large corporations, long established in 
business. As seen in Table 3, one of the first firms to arrive to Baja California was Nellcore 
Puritan Bennet Mexico, a company whose headquarters is in Massachusetts. This company is 
part of the Tyco Int., Ltd. Corporation, which has roots in the Kansas Gas Company established 
in 1913. The company later was named Puritan. In 1940 Puritan acquired Bennet to form Puritan 
Bennet Corporation.  
In 1981 Nellcore started to produce the first pulse oximetry sensor. In 1995, Nellcore 
acquired Puritan Bennet Corp. Later Mallinckrodt purchased Nellcore Puritan Bennet, which in 
2000 was acquired by Tyco to become Nellcore Puritan Bennet Mexico. This corporation has 
several divisions, one of the most important being medical equipment. Tyco has about 240,000 
employees around the world. In Mexico there are 57 firms belonging to this corporation, three of 
them in the health area, the most important  being the Tijuana factory with 3,400 employees. 
In 1984, Nellcore’s corporate chief executive officers made the decision to establish a 
firm in Tijuana, Baja California to produce the silicon parts of pulse oximetry sensors. At that 
time the Mexican federal government provided a lot of support to attract foreign firms in order to 
generate jobs; most of the foreign firms were established along the border as part of a 
government policy to concentrate the maquilas out of the main industrial centers. One of the 
most successful sectors was the electronics industry, which produced television cabinets and 
monitors. Through this industry the infrastructure of a skilled labor force was created in Tijuana. 
In addition, facilities were developed to foster an environment for producing devices related to 
the electronics industry. 
One of the main reasons for locating Nellcore in Mexico was the cost of labor and also 
that the firm was under the maquila regime, in which it still remains. The advantages of being in   60
this regime were: 1) tax exemptions for introducing inputs; 2) no quotas on imported inputs; and 
3) government support for renting land and building industrial areas. Some preconditions were 
important in Nellcore’s arrival in Tijuana, some of which are internal to the consortium: 
investors willing to put capital in this specific sector. At that time (1970s) some important 
discoveries were made, such as the heart transplant, which created great expectations for the 
sector. But there were other preconditions in the countries where subsidiaries were located: in the 
case of Mexico, the maquila system and the access to cheap inputs such as gas and plastic, 
besides the labor force. 
  During the first years in Tijuana, Nellcore had to face some uncertainties whose solution 
helped to strengthen the firm. First, the unskilled labor force meant that the first firms in Mexico 
had to implement training programs or look for other regions for better prepared workers. 
Second, delays in the input supply, caused by custom regulations, were in part solved by 
choosing Tijuana, which is one of the main urban centers on the U.S. border. And third, the poor 
quality of public services meant that some services had to be supplied by the firm, such as the 
water supply, electricity, and public transportation. 
The maquila system has been under strong criticism by Mexican politicians, the main 
reason being the low value added to Mexico that these industries have. As an example, Nellcore 
exercised the Regla Octava (the eighth rule) of the Mexican fiscal system. Under this rule a firm 
can import inputs without paying taxes, if it proves that such goods are not produced in Mexico, 
and this exemption can be renewed every six months. In this way Nellcore could import inputs 
from China without paying taxes. However, the presence of Nellcore had positive externalities 
for Tijuana and for the medical equipment industry in Mexico. 
 
1.  It developed well-trained intermediate employees. At Nellcore’s arrival in 
1981, there was a good flow of workers from other Mexican regions looking for 
a job in Tijuana; however, they were unskilled and had low formal education. 
Nellcore had to look for workers in the Southern state of Chiapas (in the very 
opposite geographical location form Baja). Since they were peasants, Nellcore 
offered them travel expenses and housing in Tijuana. These workers received 
training and started to work in very simple activities, and as they improved in 
their skills they moved to more complex duties.   61
2.  It built trust in the Mexican managers. At first all the decisions were made in 
the corporation’s headquarters. The managers were Americans and monitored 
closely all the production steps made in Tijuana. It took about ten years to 
develop managerial skills in the Mexican administrative employees to allow 
them to make important decisions in the administrative and production 
processes. 
3.  It started a cluster in the medical product sector in Baja California. By 2000 the 
Economic and Planning Department of Baja California State decided to 
implement an economic plan in which entrepreneurial development was of high 
priority. Through various studies the main economic activities of the state were 
identified, and a portfolio of key activities was designed with the consensus of 
authorities and businessmen. As a result, the Baja California Entrepreneurial 
Development Plan arose. In this Plan several economic clusters were selected. 
One of them was the production of medical equipment. Table 3 shows the main 
catheter producers and number of employees in this cluster. 
4.  It used high technology in production processes. If a new medical procedure or 
treatment requires a very sophisticated device, it pushes a technological change 
or innovation. Along with the increase in production volume and value of the 
Nellcore factory, the use of high technology in products like ventilators forced 
the development of local skills or brought highly trained professionals from 
other regions. 
 
In 1984 Nellcore had a production plant of 12,000 square feet; by 2006 it had established 
an area of 38,000 square feet. During the first years in Tijuana, and in accordance with the 
demand for medical devices in the United States, the company produced different medical 
products such as catheters and syringes. Being a maquiladora, the headquarters made all the 
decisions about the production and administrative processes. Around 1995 it started to focus on 
blood pressure devices but still produced other products including standardized catheters that 
require machinery with low technology.  
At Nellcore Tijuana oxygen sensors are still the main product, with an annual production 
of 35 million units. Other important products are: disposable urine bags; surgery kits, which are   62
very specialized and produced depending on use for the heart, kidney, or other kind of surgery; 
and urology catheters, for which demand has increased 3 percent in the last year. 
Different from the first years, now all the administrative activities and control of the 
factory are done in Tijuana. Some changes are suggested by the headquarters but the design and 
implementation are made in Tijuana. There is a formal program to reduce costs and organize 
training courses for the workers in order to improve productivity.  
  Another important phenomenon has occurred. Now direct clients, for example a 
distributor of medical products in the United States or France, ask the Tijuana factory to develop 
the whole process starting from the design to build a sample model. Once the model device is 
complete, the distributor takes the sample to test it on patients (in hospitals and clinics) and 
returns it to Tijuana for final adjustments. This process has attracted very specialized 
professionals from different parts of Mexico. New generations of well-qualified young 
immigrants are arriving in the city, receiving higher salaries than in their home cities. A main 
concern is procurement, as Nellcore has relations with about 800 providers, and only one is 
Mexican and provides a very low value added product: the tags for the bags.  
Large changes came around 2002 when the demand for some special medical products 
started to increase. Changes in surgical procedures require some specific medical devices such as 
surgery kits, which must include all the instruments needed in the medical procedures. The 
demand for special instruments increased. For example, heart surgery requires specific scalpels 
and valves that are now produced in Nellcore Tijuana. However, the firm responded slowly to 
the technological change regarding catheters; Nellcore continues producing the traditional ones, 
those made with very low technology. In addition, they have not moved to take advantage of the 
opportunity to offer a very important step in the production of medical equipment: the 
sterilization process. All the medical equipment products are required to be sterilized, according 
to Food and Drug Administration rules, rules, to be sterilized, and the lack of risk capital to build 
a provider in Tijuana forces all the medical equipment firms to take the products to a sterilization 
firm located in the United States.   
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4.2 Followers  
 
a) Main Follower: Medtronics 
 
The most important follower of Nellcore is Medtronics, which was established in Tijuana in 
1998. It is part of the international corporation with the same brand name, which has annual sales 
of 12 billion dollars and 35,000 employees around the world. By 1997, Medtronics had a factory 
producing catheters for aneurisms in San Diego. A federal law was approved in the United States 
restricting the use of the patent for this type of catheter. The headquarters looked for a place 
where it could avoid such restrictions and find a low-cost labor force. Some international 
consulting firms advised the chief executive officer in San Diego to choose Tijuana, and 
recommended hiring a Mexican manager for the new factory.  
The manager chosen has played an important role in the firm’s development in Mexico. 
He knew the market well because he had been a businessman in Mexico City. Some conditions 
were settled by this manager to work in the consortium, such as having full control in the 
administrative aspects. At first a shelter company was hired to look for workers, but after a while 
this duty was under the manager’s control. It is important to say that most of the diffusion 
process was done under the shelter company’s authority. Although many medical products are 
produced under patents, there are a lot of important administrative and distribution aspects that 
are key in the success of a firm. Shelter companies are firms that help solve all the bureaucratic 
steps in setting up a firm in Tijuana, including the selection of the place to build the factory. The 
knowledge obtained by the shelters through consulting and assessment is an important base in 
the Baja California medical cluster.  
The factory started to produce catheters for aneurisms in January 1998, with 150 workers 
and the ISO 9000 certificate. Around 2000, the heart devices division of Medtronics Corporation 
in the United States was losing money because of obsolete technology. From 14 factories around 
the world, 10 were closed and moved to Tijuana, being incorporated into the local factory. The 
strategy of Medtronics Tijuana differed from the headquarters, since the local manager had a 
more aggressive strategy, both in production and in distribution. Since the beginning the goal 
was to expand the products and not to concentrate in just a few. They provided products to other 
areas of the medical division, not only catheters for aneurisms. Now they produce the whole kit 
for heart surgery.    64
The factory started to produce in an industrial plant that had been part of a Panasonic 
factory that had been producing television monitors but went into bankruptcy. Now Medtronics 
has several plants in the same industrial area. The average number of workers is 1,500 and 
annual sales are around U.S. $400,000,000.  
Medtronics Tijuana is a high tech factory, with the most advanced clean-room technology 
(given that these devices are used in surgery, all have to be very aseptic). However when they 
require a very special technology, the device is sent to Ireland and then back to Tijuana to 
complete the process.  
There are three important problems. The first problem is procurement. Because all the 
inputs are imported, they have tried to develop providers in Mexico but the investment is high 
and therefore so is the risk. The second problem is worker rotation. Although Tijuana has a flow 
of immigrants, these workers just stay a few months and then move to another factory or to the 
United States. The third problem is lack of a sterilization plant for the final products. 
 
b) Block Medical 
Block Medical is the case of a small factory also located in Tijuana. It is part of Inflow 
Corporation with headquarters in California. It produces different medical equipment products. 
Since the plant was established in 1985, it has specialized in local anesthetic kits and portable 
infusion pumps.   
This factory fits more the model of a maquiladora. All the processes are made in the 
headquarters, including the design, the sample tests, and distribution. Different from the above 
firms, Block Medical does not have a direct relationship with the client.  
However, it has experienced a large increase in sales in the past two years. In 2003 sales 
were U.S. $ 80 million and this year they will be U.S. $120 million. This increment was mainly 
because of the increased demand for catheters. Although the star product is the elastometric 
pump, for which the factory has the patent, it is planning to expand in order to produce catheters. 
Because it is a relatively small factory, Block Medical does not have any problems hiring 
workers. It has around 300 workers who receive three times the minimum legal salary in Mexico. 
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c) Del Mar 
Del Mar is a factory that was established in Tijuana in 1997. It belongs to a sole American 
owner, who travels two or three times per week from his hometown in California to Tijuana. 
They began with a small plant located in one of the oldest industrial parks in the city, with 200 
workers. The administrative issues are handled locally but under the supervision of the owner. 
The factory has experienced the increase in demand for catheters, and produces about 
150,000 units per month. The factory produces about 400 varieties of disposable products, from 
syringes to scalpels. Given the increase in demand, it rented more space to build two clean 
rooms, one for tests and the other for producing the surgery kits, and now it hires 800 workers. 
This year the plan is for sales to reach around U.S. $100 million.   
 
4.3.   The Nuevo Laredo Cluster 
In the past two years, a new cluster has developed in the city of Nuevo Laredo, which is located 
on the border with the city of Laredo, Texas. Nuevo Laredo is one of the busiest crossings along 
the Mexico-United States line because it is the entry port to the United States that is used by 
many freight-line companies. The carretera nacional (National Highway 54) connects to U.S. 
35, linking Mexico City and Monterrey to the border. 
 
a) Medline 
This company has its headquarters in Chicago, Illinois. Its Nuevo Laredo factory started in 1988 
producing generic catheters and was located downtown (at that time Nuevo Laredo was still a 
small city). Three years ago, in 2003, it had to move to an industrial park that was a 30-minute 
drive from Nuevo Laredo. The company has 1,000 workers and three main product lines: stock, 
for the market’s sudden changes; catalog purchases; and direct clients.  
The main product of Medline is surgery kits, which include everything required in the 
surgery room, from scalpels to baby cloths (in the case of a delivery). Regarding urinary 
catheters, until recently they had to buy them in the United States and include them in the kit; 
now they produce part in Nuevo Laredo and the rest in the Chicago factory. An important aspect 
is that this company does not have direct contact with the clients. 
  Given that this plant faces strong pressure from its headquarters, it is very actively 
looking for ways to reduce costs. Recently it found a provider that prints the instructions   66
brochure in Monterrey. In addition, the company receives local government support through 
training courses for the workers in order to improve productivity. 
 
b) Teleflex 
Teleflex Inc. is a large corporation with several divisions, one of them in the medical branch. 
The corporation established a subsidiary in Nuevo Laredo in 2004. It is located on 400,000 
square feet in one of the new industrial parks along a main highway that connects National 
Highway 54 with International Bridge No. 2. Among others, one objective of Medical Teleflex’s 
arrival in Nuevo Laredo was to look for an opportunity to enter with a very aggressive policy in 
the medical devices market and to take advantage of the market boom in urinary catheters.  
  Teleflex’s strategy is to consolidate several well-known medical brands in one 
consortium. In doing so, it bought five companies, including their patents and brand names. The 
factory is located next to the automotive factory of Teleflex but has a different management 
system. Regarding the production of catheters, Teleflex Inc. did not have the molds to produce 
the catheter as this part of the production process is very expensive; so instead of buying new 
machinery and learning the process by themselves, the headquarters decided to buy the Hudson 
company. Located in Baja California, it had two plants, a large one located in Ensenada and a 
small one in Tecate. In four weeks, the Teleflex people learned the production process to 
produce standardized catheters from the Ensenada factory, then fired all the 1,100 workers, 
closed the installation, and moved the machinery to Nuevo Laredo. However, the transference 
faced a lot of problems. While in Baja catheters were produced with silicon, in Nuevo Laredo 
they were made of pellets (which is an obsolete technology), and as a result the general manager 
was fired and now the Baja California community has a bad opinion of the corporation. Teleflex 
produces several types of catheters, more of the generic type (different from the case of 
Medtronic, which specializes in a very sophisticated type). The catheters are packed under the 
name of Hudson; in this way they retained the clients, who in this market segment are very 
sensitive to quality.  
  The same strategy that was used in the Hudson case was implemented with the Rusch 
Company in the production of respirators and syringes. According to the manager of quality 
production, they are expecting about 110 million dollars in sales in 2006, which seems a low 
amount given that the initial investment in the factory was about one billion dollars. Another   67
goal of the factory is to produce enough products to be sent to Germany, and in addition to 
increase the offer for the U.S. market. 
  Different from Baja California, Nuevo Laredo does not have problems hiring blue-collar 
workers or employees with college degrees. Most of the intermediate level workers come from 
Monterrey, which is located at a two-hour drive from Nuevo Laredo. In addition, this location 
has the advantage that right after crossing the border it is easy to access the highway to Dallas, 
Texas, where the sterilization plant is located and all the products have to be sent for the final 
process of sterilization. 
 
4.4. The Role of the Shelter  
The shelter is a figure that arose in 1980 in Baja California along with the maquila boom. One of 
the first firms was Offshore Promotion Inc. This company was located in the same industrial 
park as some of the most important maquilas. The objective was to help the American 
corporations to have an easy landing in Tijuana. Foreign firms, unknowledgeable about Mexico’s 
legal procedures for establishing a firm, may opt to hire the services of a shelter to facilitate their 
arrival.  At first, the clients were small companies that did not have the financial support to face 
strong risks in their move to Tijuana. One way to minimize costs was to obtain a whole kit of 
services from the shelter: 
  
•  Location. The shelter looks for a location for the factory, either in an 
industrial park or in a well located plant. 
•  Legal services. The shelter handles all the legal requirements such as propriety 
permissions (in Mexico urban plans determine the use of city land and it is 
mandatory to build in the right space), access to public services, tax payments, 
environmental permission, custom documents, etc. 
•  To look for and to hire employees, mainly blue-collar workers. Tijuana is 
located in a border crossing where migrants enter the United States without a 
legal passport. Therefore a continuous flow of unskilled workers are looking 
for temporary work in Tijuana. The shelter helps select the best workers and 
reduce the turnover. As a strategy to attract workers, it is common practice to 
offer 10 percent above the salary of other firms.    68
•  Administrative duties, accounting, payroll, and back office activities are also 
provided by the shelter. 
 
Some shelters still continue providing all the services; others offer just a few and have 
changed to an outsourcing mode. Some others, such as Bucher Industries, which started in 1986, 
shifted to establishing a warehouse in San Diego, where it is easier to provide customs permits 
and transportation for raw materials to Tijuana. They have twin factories, one in San Diego or in 
another place in California, but close to the border, and another in Tijuana. In addition, they 
make alliances with American firms to provide logistical services. 
Bucher Industries started in 2006 providing incubation for small firms; through joint 
ventures they connected small entrepreneurs with large companies, such as H Steel or Hilfinger. 
  
5)  Counterfactual: Stem Cell Bank 
 
The counterfactual analysis for the case of medical equipment is the business of cord blood 
banks. This medical service offers the collection and preservation of newborn babies’ umbilical 
cord blood stem cells in order to safeguard families from many life-threatening diseases.  Stem 
cells are the master cells normally in our bone marrow and are found in the baby’s cord blood. 
The cells are used to treat more than 70 diseases such as non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, leukemia, 
and sickle cell disease, and have been used in many transplants world-wide. The collection 
process consists in taking the cord blood immediately after a baby’s birth, but generally before 
the placenta has been delivered, which is the only opportunity to harvest a newborn’s stem cells. 
Within 38 to 48 hours of collection, the blood is processed and tested, and its stem cells 
cryogenically stored (frozen). 
In Mexico, there are few stem cell banks offering this type of service. One of these is 
Cryo Cell. In 2001, Cryo Cell International established its first affiliate in Mexico and rapidly 
got the 1S0 2001-2000 official recognition to become the first private blood bank to obtain it. 
The high-tech laboratory located in Guadalajara has automatic systems for fires, electric failures, 
and floods; sophisticated control access; and cryo-tanks protected inside an anti-earthquake 
bunker. It also has state-of-the-art video surveillance systems that monitor all building entrances, 
laboratories, and the cryogenic storage.    69
The laboratory where the cells are stored is in Guadalajara, and the headquarters is settled 
in Monterrey. The main reason is that Monterrey represents the highest demand and is the site of 
physicians and hospitals that are able to perform the medical procedures to collect the cells. In 
addition, Monterrey is a city with a health sector that has been growing in the past years.  
José Cohen, owner of Cryo Cell, made a high investment taking risk capital from 
relatives; the business had rapid success obtaining the return on its capital in less than a year. Mr. 
Cohen has looked to export the services of Cryo Cell Mexico to clients in Texas, but has faced 
lack of trust in the medical techniques applied by a Mexican firm. In addition there are some 
conditions that limit the possibilities for export:  
 
•  The laboratories cannot be settled in every city. Guadalajara was chosen 
because it fulfilled the requirements to build and maintain the cryo-tanks. The 
most relevant condition is “the correct year-round temperature” and only this 
city matched this criterion. In addition, the population density is the highest at 
Guadalajara. Therefore, trying to export this business would be difficult and it 
has not grown as much as the owners would have liked.  
•  Cryo Cell gets approximately 120 clients per month; however, according to 
Mr. Cohen, there still exists a “cultural barrier” that has a negative effect in 
this business. People tend to have different ideas (or ignorance) about what 
stem cells are and how they can help them. This service is extremely new in 
Mexico and only a few people can afford it. Moreover, Mexican couples do 
not tend to consider this product as medical insurance. All these factors slow 
down the process of export to other countries. 
 
As seen before, Nellcore, Medline, and many other medical firms have found customers 
in California. High amounts of capital have been invested by these firms, the latest technology in 
clean rooms and machinery is part of their business, and sales are growing fast. This is not the 
case at stem cell banks, where the diffusion process is not the same and is much slower. In 
Mexico, the stem cell bank markets are still limited. Along with Cryo Cell, only three firms offer 
this service: Cordón Vital, Concesión de Ginecología Guadalajara, and a small hospital in 
Mexico City.  
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6)  Policy Recommendations 
 
According to its socioeconomic characteristics, Mexico can be categorized as an emerging 
country. Although it made large improvements in terms of macroeconomic aspects, where it has 
reached stability (the rate of inflation was around 3 percent in 2006 and the exchange rate 
variation was around 1 percent), on the microeconomic side 90 percent of the firms are small, 
with financial problems and low productivity. 
The health sector looks like an opportunity to develop some important competencies in 
Mexico’s economy:  
 
•  To hire and to train blue-collar workers in productive methodologies with 
high technologies 
•  To use and develop natural resources, such as the raw materials used in the 
production of medical equipment and medicines 
•  To attract foreign direct investment and to look for partners in joint ventures 
•  To develop value chains in specific regions 
•  To promote innovation and technical change 
•  To improve the balance of payments through increased exports. 
 
To reach these goals, it is necessary to apply some public policies. Some of the most 
relevant are the following. 
 
6.1. Education and Technical Training 
Universities and technical schools must improve the quality of the students. Federal authorities in 
the education sector have to establish programs to develop research abilities. Medical schools in 
Mexico are recognized for the quality of diagnosis and patient attention, but the students do not 
have research abilities and/or scientific curiosity. Most of the students at higher levels are in 
administrative areas, causing a deficit of professionals in the engineering and technical areas. 
 
6.2. Legal Aspects 
Federal and local authorities should reform the legal procedures for establishing a firm. Some of 
the requirements to open a firm are very complicated, and sometimes it takes six months to start 
a business. In the case of medical equipment that uses special substances, the health secretariat   71
and the environmental department have to supervise all the productive processes to approve the 
firm, delaying the start of production. 
 
6.3. Facilities Provision 
Industrial parks and designated industrial areas with access to public services are key in 
facilitating the arrival of foreign firms or the decision to establish local investment in the 
production of medical equipment. An important aspect is to identify the most important elements 
in the health cluster to promote the development of the health sector. This review of the 
production of medical equipment in Mexico shows that Baja California, Nuevo Leon, 
Chihuahua, and Mexico City are the areas with a high concentration of firms in the sector. 
Catheters are devices with a high market value but there are about 2,000 products that could also 
be part of the export potential of the country. 
 
6.4 Financial Support 
The federal government could provide special funds to promote research and development in the 
sector and to support investment in special areas. As the managers said in the interviews, lack of 
risk capital is an obstacle to building a sterilizer plant in Mexico. If the firms had access to 
sterilize their products in Mexico, the time and costs of production could be reduced in an 
important way. 
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Interviews  
 
Bandala, Carlos, Quality production manager, Nellcore Puritan Bennett Mexico S.A. de C.V. 
(Tyco Nellcore Healthcare), Tijuana, Mexico. 
Cohen, José, General manager, Cryo-Cell, Stem Cell Banking, Monterrey, Mexico. 
Concha de la, Gerardo, Manufacturing manager, Medtronic México, S. de R.L. de C.V., Tijuana, 
México. 
García, Miguel Ángel, Marketing - Customer Service, Offshore Promotion Inc., Tijuana, 
Mexico. 
Garza, Jose Luis, Manufacturing manager, Teleflex Medical, Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. 
Hernández, Octavio, General manager, Bucher Industries, Tijuana, México. 
Herrera, Jaime, Vice-president, Productos Medline, S.A. de C.V., Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. 
Moreno, Omar, Senior Manufacturing engineer, Block Medical de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 
Tijuana, Mexico. 
Rico, Manuel, Manufacturing manager, Del Mar Biotecología, S.A. de C.V. (Integra 
Biotechincal), Tijuana, Mexico. 
Rocha, Natacha, Coordinator of the health cluster, Secretaria de Economia del Estado de Baja 
California.   73
III. Outsourced Call Center Services in Mexico   
 
To increase their productivity and focus on their core competencies, many companies have 
turned to outsourcing both manufacturing and service operations. This trend has opened up 
opportunities for developing countries, including Mexico. Before going into the details of the 
Mexican case, the following section will examine this issue at the international level, focusing on 
business process outsourcing and the call center industry in order to assess the scope and 
potential of this new phenomenon.   
 
Business Process Outsourcing  
Business process outsourcing refers to the outsourcing of business processes and functions in the 
areas of administration, finance, human resources, distribution logistics, manufacturing services, 
sales, marketing, and customer care. These functions are outsourced to locations that can provide 
the services at a lower cost through high-speed data communication links, which guarantee 
timely delivery of data and services. Figure 7 shows the different activities in the business 
process outsourcing sector. The call center sector, which will be examined in this paper, is 
located under the customer care branch of business process outsourcing.    74
Figure 7.  
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relationship between the customer and the enterprise. This relationship was supported by 
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in what used to be a purely mercantile relationship between the customer and the enterprise 
(Micheli, 2004).  
According to the Call Center Association, there have been four key stages in the 
development of the sector.  The first one, taking off in the mid-1980s, was aimed at cutting back 
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saw the expansion and growth of telemarketing businesses and outsourcing enterprises that 
emerged from the growing need to outsource parts of administrative tasks.     
 The  gradual  specialization of the call centers led to the creation of companies specifically 
devoted to provide these services, which ranged from customer service to searching for new 
clients. This fourth stage began in the XXI century and is characterized by a cost-reduction 
motivation and an increase in off-shoring to regions and countries with low wages. 
Technological development and the spread of communication technologies have facilitated 
relocation. Call centers moved first to North Africa, India, and South Africa to supply the French 
and English-speaking markets in Europe and North America. Later, the Hispanic market in the 
United States propelled the emergence of call centers in Latin America to serve this niche.   
The development of call centers in Mexico is situated in this stage. There are economic, 
cultural, and geographical advantages underlying Mexico’s success as a host country for call 
centers. First, cost reduction is mainly based in low wages that make labor from 50 percent to 75 
percent cheaper than in developed countries (Martino 2004: 6).  Second, membership in NAFTA 
has facilitated the installation of operation centers and set up an enabling legal framework. 
Another important factor is language. The United States has experienced a considerable increase 
in its Spanish-speaking population, which has surpassed 40 million.
34 Thus, call center agents 
need to be bilingual to serve this market.  Finally, geographic proximity is also important. 
Sharing 2,000 kilometers of border with the United States allows enterprises to maintain close 
contact with the centers providing the services. And, contrary to India’s position, Mexico shares 
time-zones with the United States, which can be an advantage in some services.  
The next section will examine how call center service exports emerged and developed. 
Specifically it presents the case of the pioneering company Hispanic Teleservices.  
 
                                                 
34 In 2005, according to the U.S. Census Bureau there were 41.8 million Hispanics in the United States, which is 
about 14.5 percent of the population. Hispanics are the first minority in the United States. Only 16 years ago, the 
population was half that level, at 22.4 million.    76
1)  Breaking Ground in the Hispanic Customer Service Market: The Hispanic 
Teleservices Corporation 
The Mexican Hispanic Teleservices Corporation was the first firm to export in the customer 
service sector targeted at the Hispanic market in the United States. The growing potential of the 
Spanish-speaking market in the United States was the idea that spurred the development of this 
company.  
The Hispanic Teleservices case is the story of a young individual entrepreneur, not that of 
an existing firm, which makes it relevant to examine his personal career in order to have a better 
understanding of the evolution, strategies, and lessons of this case.  
 
1.1. A Young, Bicultural, Mexican Entrepreneur and How He Found a Niche 
Hispanic Teleservices was founded in Monterrey, Mexico in 1999 by the young local 
entrepreneur Alberto Fernandez. He holds a BA in Economics from Notre Dame University and 
an MBA from Georgetown University.    
During his stay in the United States, Fernandez realized the need and potential for 
providing services to the Hispanic market, a group with a purchasing power estimated at around 
U.S. $475 billion.  What sets this market apart in the United States is that Hispanics maintain 
strong links with their countries of origin and thus with their mother tongue. A large part of the 
Hispanic population in the United States is either Latin America-born or first-generation 
immigrant. This creates a huge need for bilingual (Spanish-English) customer services.  
Born into an entrepreneurial family, Fernandez always had the objective of developing 
his own business; however, to do so, he needed to gather the required skills, experience, and 
contacts.  
 
1.2. Gathering the Experience Needed to Develop a Business of His Own 
In 1994, after having completed his BA studies in the United States, Fernandez returned to 
Mexico at a moment when the country was suffering a deep financial and economic crisis.  One 
of the hardest hit sectors was banking, which had passed from a nationalization process in 1982 
to one of re-privatization and liberalization in the early 1990s. To deal with the crisis, the sector 
was restructuring its management and services processes. This created opportunities for recently 
graduated professionals, who were selected to replace senior managers that had been fired in the   77
attempt to cut payroll costs. At 24 years old, Fernandez was hired as a branch manager by the 
Confia Bank, of the Abaco Group. 
One of Fernandez’s first contributions was to develop a special area for bank clients to 
perform some basic transactions while avoiding long waiting lines. In a short period of time, he 
sought new challenges and was transferred to the re-engineering and process improvement 
department. In that time, the bank had no distance banking services, partly due to the fact that the 
telecommunications sector was still a public monopoly with very high costs. Yet new 
communication technologies were starting to emerge.  
Wanting to improve banking services, Fernandez made a proposal based on the use of 
communication technologies. This would be his first contact with this sort of activity. The 
proposal led to the creation of an entity called ABASER, with three call centers operating in 
Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. Through the use of a toll-free line, the bank began 
providing distance services, first allowing its clients to check their account balance with only a 
telephone call. The main difficulties that Fernandez and his team faced were high technology 
costs and budget restrictions to hire personnel. To overcome such difficulties and take advantage 
of economies of scale, they provided outsourcing services to Abaseguros (another company 
belonging to the Confía Group) and GM Mexico. With GM Mexico it was agreed that ABASER 
would provide services in exchange for having GM Mexico absorb the payroll costs. It was also 
agreed that the recruitment, selection, and training would be under the direct control of 
Fernandez.  
While Fernandez was working at Banca Confía, he also started up his own business. With 
a group of friends, he opened a small manufacturing enterprise to manufacture luxury ties. 
However, the enterprise failed because of the extremely high cost of silk and the equipment 
needed to produce the ties.  
In 1997 Fernandez left Mexico once again to study for an MBA at Georgetown 
University. By that time, he had already learned several lessons that would later prove useful for 
his next enterprise, both from his experience in ABASER and from the failed enterprise. Both 
would be key for the creation of his future business.  
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1.3. Implementing the Business Idea 
When he arrived in the United States to pursue his master’s degree, Fernandez already had a 
business idea in mind: a call center to service the Hispanic market.  He used his courses in the 
MBA program at Georgetown (1997-99) to develop his idea. Specifically, he took advantage of 
two courses: Emerging Companies and Entrepreneurship. Fernandez recalls that at the very 
beginning he faced skepticism from his classmates. For the Entrepreneurship course, students 
were required to develop a business plan in groups. It was the Internet and IT boom and 
everyone wanted to develop online businesses. Fernandez pitched his call center idea but no one 
wanted to join his team. Fernandez argued that the need to serve the Hispanic market was 
inevitable and had great potential; plus, his project would go beyond a class project because he 
wanted to materialize it.  He was able to convince Kit Cooper, who became not only his 
teammate but also his real-life business partner. Both completed their studies and agreed to 
develop and execute their business plan.  
The call center would be based in Monterrey because Fernandez believed this Mexican 
industrial city, settled in the North of Mexico and close to the U.S. border, had the required labor 
force: bilingual and bicultural.  Since Fernandez and his family were from this city, he had a 
valuable social capital network. Nevertheless this did not guarantee him access to the financial 
capital required to start operations.  
The main obstacle was the lack of economic resources, which took one year to overcome. 
There were no investors willing to take the risk in Mexico. According to Fernandez, “Many 
Mexican businessmen had their capital offshore and they did not want to invest in innovative 
ideas. If they showed some interest, they wanted to have a 100 percent return rate for 
themselves... some businessmen like Alfonso Romo [from Pulsar] had venture capital yet it was 
a very limited amount.” That is why Fernandez and his partner looked for funding abroad, 
specifically in the United States.  
In addition to the business plan, to win some credibility vis-à-vis American banks, he 
created an advisory board comprised of some of the most prominent Mexican and Hispanic 
businessmen. Among them were Carlos Abascal (Afianzadora Insurgentes), Armando Garza 
Sada (Grupo Alfa), Eduardo Garza T. (Frisa), and José Niño (ex-president of the Hispanic 
Business Chamber and ex-advisor to President Bush, Sr. and Dany Villanueva, a Hispanic   79
businessman from California). Except for Eduardo Garza T., the members of the advisory board 
gave Fernandez their moral support but no financial capital.   
The way the entrepreneur managed to access funding among U.S. investors was 
interesting because he used not only his professional skills, but also his social capital. 
Throughout his undergraduate and graduate studies in the United States, he had made some 
friends who would later work in finance and banking firms like JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley. 
It was these friends who in 2000 helped Fernandez to get some appointments with investment 
banks and some of them even provided part of the capital needed for the project.  
Fernandez and Cooper found an investor interested in their project in San Francisco, 
California: JP Morgan Latin American Partners Venture Capital. Since the funding was granted 
under very strict conditions, the entrepreneurs decided to offer/sell just 40 percent of the 
enterprise value.  
Besides the financial conditions, there were three other conditions: (1) to have a 
technology director, (2) to look for a senior director instead of having Kit Cooper in this position 
because he was too young, and (3) to hire a Mexican operations director selected by JP Morgan.     
To meet the first condition, Fernandez resorted to his longtime contacts from Banca 
Confía and hired Alejandro Jaimes as technology director. Jaimes had participated in the creation 
of the ABASER customer service center and was working for a telecommunications company 
called Alestra (partly owned by AT&T). Finding the senior director was more difficult, and it 
took them more than a year to fill the position. The third condition was immediately met by 
hiring a person from the banking sector in Mexico recommended by JP Morgan.  
To sum up, the first and largest obstacle was obtaining the financial capital needed to 
start up the business.  Besides the originality of the idea, the obstacle was overcome with the 
application of the business expertise gathered so far and thoughtful use of Fernandez’s social 
capital in Mexico and the United States. 
  Once they had the capital needed and the managerial team, Hispanic Teleservices began 
operations in Monterrey, specifically in San Pedro Garza García. They rented two floors in a 
building where they set up 30 work stations. Surprisingly, when Fernandez tells the story, the 
handling of technology does not appear as a problem. This might be because he was backed up 
by people who had wide experience in the field. For example, a former colleague from Banca 
Confía, Daniel Aldrete, was appointed network architecture director. Aldrete was an expert in   80
voice-network technologies and had managed the predictive dialer systems for Banca Confía.  
Later, Noel Orozco, another former Banca Confía colleague, would join the team as head of 
Technology and Information. Kit Cooper also had acquired experience in business process 
outsourcing while he worked for Fritz Companies in Houston. 
 
1.4 Getting the First Clients  
The main uncertainty in the planning phase was related to the first clients. The objective of 
Hispanic Teleservices (HTS) was to go beyond simple telemarketing, providing a more complex 
service to its clients. As sales director, Kit Cooper looked for clients in the United States using a 
door-to-door strategy. He visited many companies that had Hispanic customers and offered them 
HTS services. Although it did not want to do telemarketing, their first client, UPS, hired them to 
do a telephone sales campaign. This allowed the newly created company to begin operations in 
the year 2000 using 50 percent of its capacity, for which they hired 15 employees.  
  Another important uncertainty was to prove whether the human resources available in 
Monterrey were in fact adequate to their needs.  They knew that people in Monterrey were 
bilingual and bicultural, so in theory labor would not be a problem. However, they did not know 
whether the available pool was suitable for conducting telephone conversations and servicing 
Hispanic customers. With their first projects, they realized that the labor force was in fact 
suitable and they just needed to implement an adequate and careful recruitment and training 
process.  
  The desired client appeared a few months after the UPS project: Sage Telecom.  In the 
sales effort, HTS had contacted Sage Telecom but it was not until 2001 that the company signed 
a contract with them.  Fernandez recalls that Sage had visited other well-established Mexican 
companies servicing the domestic market, yet they chose Hispanic because they liked their 
organization and their human resources approach.  
  The project involved high levels of training, security, and quality control. The operational 
costs were so high that after six months of the contract with Sage, Cooper and Fernandez 
realized they only had resources to cover the fixed costs of two more months of operations. JP 
Morgan offered them additional funding but at high rates, so they decided to visit Sage’s 
director, explain the situation to him, and ask him for support. Fernandez was really surprised   81
when the director agreed to lend them the funds without asking for large concessions in the 
interest rates or the buying/selling prices set up in the service contract that HTS had with Sage.  
  Another round to increase the financial capital required to expand operations was 
undertaken by mid-2001. It was then that JP Morgan along with Citicorp Venture Capital 
acquired an additional 11 percent of the company’s value, summing to 51 percent of the assets. 
Since then, HTS has financed its growth with its own capital using its operational flows and 
profits.  
  In 2002 they got another important client, America Online (AOL), for which they now 
offer 100 percent of their customer services in Spanish in the U.S. market.   
 
1.5. Description of the Call Center Operation   
The call service industry inserts itself globally in a production chain comprising a wide range of 
technological services, beginning from the most essential ones (such as computers and web 
access) up to the most sophisticated services that develop new technology. In between those 
extremes, a series of software for call management is included.  
The value chain of the call center industry is quite limited. There are three basic inputs: 
communication technology equipment, networking service providers, and bilingual human 
resources, which frequently come from local universities.  The contracting companies provide 
the client databases and the guidelines for the specific services that the outsourced call center 
will provide.  The call center thus is in charge of processing the information and the resulting 
outputs are customer services. 
 
Figure 8. The Value Chain of the Call Center Industry 
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It is worth noting that in the case of Mexico, the call center industry has a few local 
providers, with the rest hired in the United States. The companies that set up operations buy their 
communication technology equipment and networking services abroad. The bilingual human 
resources are sourced locally, most of the time coming from universities and sometimes from job 
fairs organized by public entities.  The contracting companies are mostly American and the 
customer services provided are exported.  
At the internal level, the activity developed by the call center is incorporated in the 
development of outsourcing, which comprises several options: marketing, sales, customer 
service, insurance policy management, or the management of relationships between a company 
and its suppliers or clients. The operation of a call center is basically divided into two processes: 
inbound calls and outbound calls (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. In-bound and Out-bound Calls 
OUT-BOUND CALLS   MOST FREQUENT SERVICES 
•  Offering of a product or 
service 
Known as “cold” calls. Probably the most emblematic part of 
telemarketing. An example of these is calls to produce commitments to 
pay debts. 
•  Market Research 
Calls to find out people’s political or consumer preferences. Calls may 
be linked to offering certain products. 
IN-BOUND CALLS    
•  Fulfillment of information   
needs 
Calls to request information as part of a post-purchase service. Calls to 
ask for information or social support. Emergencies. Hot lines. 
•  Purchase of a product or 
service 
Calls to encourage purchase merchandise or services after some kind 
of advertising. 
•  Customer care service  Calls to request technical support, invoicing, or payment. 
•  Credit and insurance  Activation of an insurance or credit account. 
        Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Micheli (2006). 
 
 
  Given the available technological infrastructure, HTS chose to specialize in inbound call 
services. An inbound call center is a customer service system where calls from customers of the 
outsourcing client arrive to be handled by agents or operators.    83
  The process of an inbound call center starts with a call from a costumer of the 
outsourcing client. The call goes directly to the call center and is channeled to an agent. This first 
step needs a call distributor such as the ACD (Automatic Call Distributor), which is able to keep 
a record of the time needed by each agent to process every call. Because of this record, the ACD 
is also able to assign the incoming call to the agent with the longest idle time. Some inbound 
machines also have an interactive voice response, where the calls that do not need an agent are 
processed by the ACD itself. A critical issue is to keep the correct balance between the number 
of agents and the volume of calls.   
 
Figure 9. The In-bound Call Process 
 
 
When an agent takes a call, two fundamental challenges appear: service level and 
response time objectives. Supervisors have to plan and set up these objectives. The call center 
has some specific tools to help supervisors with the management of time, like the answering 
speed average, which provides the average time that a caller waits on line, and the average call 
duration. The quality development department is in charge of controlling the quality level of the 
call, establishing and managing quality service level agreements. Inbound call centers work 
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Production Organization 
 
HTS handles different kinds of clients that have a strong influence on the way the work is 
organized. Agents’ activities change according to the type of activity each call demands. The 
range of actions to be performed goes from selling a product, to fixing a technical problem or 
registering an insurance policy, for instance. Three different clients provide examples: Sage U.S. 
Telecom, AOL, and a company from the credit and insurance sector. 
In the cases of SAGE U.S. Telecom and AOL, the operator needs to have the following 
skills: the ability to sell the product to a prospective client when the client calls to ask for basic 
information, and the technical language and knowledge to provide technical assistance (see 
Figures 10 and 11). 
 
Figure 10.  
SAGE U.S. Telecom’s Call Process 
 
 
  Source: Authors’ elaboration based on interviews. 
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Figure 11. 
AOL’s Call Process 
 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews. 
 
In the case of a client from the credit and insurance sector, this company requests the call 
center supplier to guarantee strict confidentiality of the customers’ personal data, which requires 
the company to certify its procedures in the ISO27001 norm (see Figure 12). This can represent 
an important entry barrier for competitors.  
 
Figure 12. The Process for Credit and Insurance Companies 
   
 Source: Authors’ compilation based on interviews. 
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Training Process 
 
To solve the uncertainty of whether the labor force was suitable or not, HTS developed a 
recruitment and training process for agents that is key to its success.  There is an internal 
“university” with a long and meticulous recruitment and training system. The nature of the 
activity, providing services by telephone, requires not only English language and information 
technology skills. Call agents must also have strong control of their emotions. The training 
processes developed by each company help to improve labor skills and are a key differentiation 
factor.  
The HTS recruitment and training process is made up of four stages. The first one is an 
interview to filter the candidates. Once they pass this filter, candidates begin a second stage, 
where their English fluency is assessed through a simulation of a conversation involving five 
people at the same time. In the third stage, the agents attend a full-time training session for two 
weeks. During this time, in which they start receiving a reduced salary (50 percent), role play is 
one of the most frequent training methods, as well as short courses about the working philosophy 
of the enterprise.  The fourth stage is an in-situ training that lasts 4 to 8 weeks facing real cases. 
This phase consists of three sub-stages: the first one is to practice the use of IT systems, in the 
second the trainees have to imitate the communication process of the more experienced agents, 
and in the third sub-stage they begin to answer real-life calls with the help of their supervisor and 
the more experienced agents.  
 
1.6. Overcoming Coordination Difficulties 
The toughest coordination difficulty was technical and it was related to the handling of incoming 
calls from the United States and how to transfer them to Mexico to be handled by the agents in 
Monterrey.  The solution was to create a co-location in Houston, which received the calls on a 
toll-free U.S. line. They had to hire a private network between Monterrey and Houston to 
transmit the data without using public telephone services because long-distance calls were 
extremely expensive. The private network allowed large amounts of data transmission through 
cables. The installation was smooth, thanks to a close collaboration with the provider of the 
service, called MCI–Avantel. This American company had arrived in the country in the mid-
1990s after the liberalization of the telecommunications sector in Mexico, and had operations in 
the United States as well as in Mexico.    87
Once operations took off, another problem emerged: HTS did not have a back-up 
network, so when the primary network was down, the service had to stop and they could not 
answer incoming calls. This problem was eventually solved after the number of clients increased 
and the company was able to absorb the costs. Yet the solution represented a significant amount 
of resources, so HTS implemented state-of-the-art technology: an MPLS network in close 
cooperation with its network providers. They even conducted simulations in a lab to test the 
performance of the new network configuration. Once adopted, it largely improved the company’s 
performance and allowed it to open up new call center facilities in other Mexican cities.   
The solution of the coordination difficulties relied not in government support or industry 
associations, but in the capacity that these entrepreneurs had to develop a close collaboration 
with their suppliers and their capability to hold simultaneous operations in Mexico and the 
United States.   
 
2)  Monterrey: A Preferred Destination for Call Centers Aimed at the Hispanic Market 
 
Imitating companies have emerged in the years following the creation of Hispanic Teleservices. 
Some of them are companies that have made greenfield investments to service the Hispanic 
market in the United States from Mexico. Others are companies that were already servicing the 
domestic market and decided to reorient part of their production to export. In 2006 the sector had 
around 15,000 agents and there were about six main enterprises (IMT 2006), most of them based 
in Monterrey.  
The main spillover from the first mover was to reveal the potential of providing services 
to the Hispanic market from Mexico and proving that the Mexican labor force was suitable to do 
so. Perhaps high entry barriers, particularly the high costs of technology and equipment, have 
prevented more domestic companies form going into the same business. Interestingly, it was the 
multinational enterprises that set up operations in Monterrey through the acquisition of domestic 
firms or through direct investment. An example of the former is Teleperformance, which bought 
Merkafon; an example of the latter is Client Logic.  
From the top five companies in the call center sector in the world, two already have 
operations in Mexico, specifically in Monterrey. Table 4 summarizes the main features of the 
HTS followers.     88
Table 4.  
Followers in the Call Center Sector in Mexico 
 








Workers  Export 
$US million 
Hispanic Teleservices  1999  1999  Mexico-USA  1 300  50 $ (2005) 
Merkafon-Sr.Tele 
Performance 
2002  1996  France   4 500  ND 
Clientlogic  2003  2005  Canada  830  32 $ (2005) 
Telvista-Compu USA  2003  1997  Mexico-USA  2500  ND 
Sutherland Global 
Services 
2006  1986  USA  ND  ND 
          Source: Author’s compilation. 




Teleperformance is the fourth-largest call center company in the world. In 2002 it took over 
Merkafon to service the Hispanic market from Mexico. Merkafon was the most important local 
company in the call center sector. It was created in 1996 by Pulsar Group to provide customer 
service to its own clients. Then it began servicing other local companies. Since its origins, 
Merkafon’s directors recognized the emerging importance of the Hispanic market and they 
wanted to serve it. Yet they chose to enter the United States through the acquisition of a similar 
company in American territory instead of trying to serve the market from their Mexican 
facilities. In May 2000, they bought Access Worldwide’s call center in Plano, Texas. Access 
Worldwide was an American direct-marketing company. The operation was renamed Merkafon 
Internacional, with 300 workstations. 
Yet in 2002, Pulsar Group fell into financial trouble so it had to sell many of its 
companies, among them Merkafon. The buyer was Teleperformance, a French company with 
world-wide operations. The ownership change allowed a reorientation of the company to the 
international market, not only Hispanic, but also European and Latin American. Currently 65 
percent of Teleperformance’s profits in Mexico are generated in the U.S. market and the rest 
come from local clients (McKeary).   89
 
 2.2. Client Logic 
Client Logic began operations in 2003 in Monterrey, attracted mainly by cultural proximity. 
Amit Shankardass, one of the top executives of the company, says he likes to visit malls around 
the world in locations where the company is planning to set up operations. After visiting 
Monterrey’s malls, he was impressed by how much they were like the ones in California. Under 
the premise that if consumers in Monterrey behave in a fashion similar to those in the United 
States, he believes local employees will better understand the services that American clients 
expect (Lyons, 2006). At the Monterrey center, the company handles a large number of 
reservations for American companies in all of Latin America and for Spanish-speakers in the 
United States (Sternlieb, 2005). 
 
2.3. Telvista 
Telvista is a company owned by Carlos Slim, the Mexican telecommunications mogul of 
TELMEX and Grupo Carso. Telvista was originally created to provide internal support to Grupo 
Carso companies in 1998. But in recent years, it began to explore opportunities in the United 
States, selling its services to clients like Verizon. As part of its strategy, Telvista bought Comp 
USA in 2001 to penetrate the U.S. market from its own territory, yet it did not envision any 
services to the Hispanic market until 2005. Telvista has used its facilities in Tijuana to do so; 
however, it also has an important part of its operations based in Dallas.     
 
2.4. Sutherland 
Sutherland began Mexican operations at its Monterrey facilities in May 2006. In a 2006 
interview, Idania Quintanilla (2006) explained that the company undertook a study to evaluate 
the feasibility of investing in Monterrey. They were attracted by the presence of competitors and 
the existence of a bilingual labor pool; however, they soon realized that the labor supply was 
scarce. Thus they decided to offer more benefits to their personnel. Specifically, they have 
sought to retain employees by offering them a full-time contract after three months. Thus, in 
Monterrey there are no technological obstacles; but the availability of labor has become limited, 
forcing companies to develop new strategies to manage their human resources.    90
3)  The First Mover’s Reactions to Competition 
 
The emergence of competitors has increased service exports. With regard to the first mover, 
competition did not sharply affect sales. HTS mentions that the Hispanic market in the United 
States is huge and a large number of companies still require bilingual customer services.  
To prevent a negative effect on its sales, HTS has looked for differentiation and has 
acquired the ISO 27001 quality standard.
35 This enabled the first mover to hold onto its clients 
and attract firms that require confidentiality.  The company has also tried to get contracts with 
very demanding clients that require a certification process that secures a certain amount of 
fidelity given the high costs involved. It also developed a consulting service to provide feedback 
to clients using the information gathered in the calls HTS handles.  
Nonetheless, competition has affected HTS by reducing the pool of human resources 
available in Monterrey.  Many of the companies that set up operations in this city went straight to 
HTS workers, offering them higher wages. Thus, they benefited from the intensive training 
process developed by HTS. This affected the first mover in the following ways: (1) considerably 
increased turnover levels,
36 (2) rising labor costs, and (3) creation of recruitment/training cost 
losses that are not recovered by the company. As a result, HTS had to open new facilities in 
Guadalajara. Yet its imitators have followed it there.  
The largest limitation faced by HTS in its expansion process was the technological 
infrastructure it had. In the year 2005, the company undertook a very important upgrading 
project in collaboration with its network providers that allows it to serve many more clients as 
well as to set up operations in many different locations.   
 
                                                 
35 The ISO 27001 standard deals with information security. It handles objectives and policies related to integrity, 
confidentiality, and accessibility (from http://www.icontec.org.co/MuestraContenido.asp?ChannelId=632).  
36  A newspaper article revealed that in Monterrey the sectors with the highest turnover rates were: call centers, at 
125 percent; retail, at 107 percent; and assembly plants, at 83 percent.    91
4)  Public Policy  
 
In the early stages of the development of the call center industry in Mexico, there were no public 
policies encouraging the emergence of service exports. What did facilitate the process was 
privatization and liberalization in the telecommunications sectors, particularly the arrival of 
foreign providers that brought with them new technologies in the early 1990s. Another positive 
factor linked to liberalization, specifically of long-distance services, is that the arrival of new 
companies also involved the improvement of infrastructure and the introduction of optic fiber in 
the country’s main cities.
37  NAFTA also set up a regulatory framework, which gave legal 
certainty to U.S. businesses, providing a specific chapter for cross-border services: Chapter 12. 
The first mover took advantage of the fact that there was a U.S. company that was able to 
provide networking services in Mexico and the United States, yet he did not receive direct 
support from the government.  Alberto Fernandez from Hispanic Teleservices recalls that in 
2000, when he went to look for support from the Economic Development Agency in Nuevo 
Leon, the long and burdensome bureaucratic process discouraged him. 
Since the year 2003, the state government of Nuevo León has undertaken some sector 
policies in a two-stage process.  In the first stage, policies were devised on a case-by-case basis. 
This is the case of Teleperformance. When the French group showed some interest in investing 
in Monterrey, the Ministry of Economic Development (SEDEC) offered to design and 
implement a program to train bilingual call center agents. The government offered scholarships 
paying one-third of the monthly wage for a period of 1 to 3 months. The company had to pay the 
other two-thirds. Unemployed people were given priority and the program was implemented in 
coordination with the Labor Council and the Faculty of Languages at the Universidad Autónoma 
de Nuevo León. In other cases, the government has organized job fairs along with the newly 
arrived companies or has granted them a reduction in the payroll tax on new employment posts. 
In the second stage, as the sector grew, the authorities realized the employment 
generation capacity of call centers and sought to expand them. At the same time, companies 
already operating in the city pushed for deeper public-private cooperation. The parties involved 
were aware of an important bottleneck that needed to be solved: many of the recruitment 
                                                 
37 By 1995 the companies had installed about 13,500 kilometers in the main cities with the participation of Alcatel-
Indetel (ITT-Telmex), AT&T, and Northern Telecom y Ericsson (Ruelas, 1995).   92
candidates did not meet the profile required to fill the posts serving English-speaking or Hispanic 
clients, particularly because of their low English-speaking abilities. 
So companies in the sector along with the Ministry of Economic Development began a 
cooperative initiative called the Call Center Industry Committee. This initiative seeks to design 
and implement a technical studies diploma to increase the pool of workers for the sector. SEDEC 
is in charge of providing the meeting place and materials, as well as the communication and 
coordination of participants. Involved companies are: Teleperformance, Hispanic Teleservices, 
Marcatel, Sutherland, GE Money, and Toptel. Three educational institutions are also 
participating: the Universidad Tec Milenio, the ICET, and the Language Department of the 
Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. They are interested in offering their knowledge, faculty, 
and facilities for the project. The Committee has met four times since July 2006 and so far is 
working to design a curriculum to set up a technical diploma. One of the major difficulties will 
be finding funding to offer scholarships for interested candidates and implementing the program.  
At the federal/national level there has not been a public policy directed at developing call 
center service exports. The closest program is PROSOFT but it has full preference for those 
companies producing software, which is a higher value-added activity. In 2005 an initiative to 
eliminate the value-added tax for long-distance calls originated in Mexico was presented to the 
Congress by one of Nuevo León’s deputies. Nevertheless the proposal was rejected.
38  
In the absence of a nationwide strategy and awareness of the creation of employment that 
call centers encourage, other Mexican states have developed their own set of policies. In general, 
the type of support available is in the form of land concessions, training, organization of job 
fairs, and tax exemptions. For example, Aguascalientes is planning to open a services park to 
attract business process outsourcing companies “being one of the strategic guidelines to stimulate 
competitiveness and technological development...the government will design tailor-made 
incentives supporting the acquisition of equipment, capital goods and up to 50 percent of the 
technological infrastructure needed” (Shwebel  2006). In Durango, the state government has 
consolidated an incentive package including financial support with federal and state resources 
that can be used to acquire or rent technological equipment, or to pay for the lease, renovation, or 
construction of buildings. It will also grant full exemption of the payroll tax for four years and a 
                                                 
38 In July 2005, Juan Carlos Pérez Góngora, deputy for Nuevo León at the Federal Congress, submitted the reform 
project, which sought to increase the attractiveness of Mexico as a call center destination. The Congress first 
approved the initiative but a couple of months later, in November, it was discarded.     93
50 percent discount of the subscription rights in the public registry of property. There are training 
scholarships for up to 60 days and programs to encourage English language learning.   
 
5)  External Non-state Actors 
 
There are some non-state actors around the call center industry that range from employer 
associations to local universities. This is the case in Monterrey, where a large part of the call 
centers have agreements with private universities through which they secure a constant inflow of 
labor, university students, in exchange for scholarships. The agreements have helped in the 
reduction of turnover rates (Teleperformance has an agreement with Universidad Regiomontana 
as well as with Tec Milenio).  
At the national level, the Mexican Telemarketing Institute (MTI) gathers some of the 
most important companies in the call center sector serving domestic and international markets. 
Every year it organizes an annual meeting where the companies showcase their products and also 
meet technological suppliers and prospective clients. MTI also supplies relevant industry 
information through its web site.   
Very recently the National Chamber of Electronic and Information Technologies has 
begun to develop certain activities around the call center sector given the technological 





Some business process outsourcing could be called “specialized business process outsourcing,” 
implying more aggregated value from the workforce. In this area, it is possible to develop remote 
services such as interpretation of x-rays, the processing of tax declarations, or design and 
engineering activities.
39 Unlike the administration of services, which are labor intensive and 
require a less qualified workforce due to the nature of the tasks, specialized business process 
outsourcing requires a qualified workforce with diagnostic ability and decision-making skills.  In 
the Mexican case, specialized business process outsourcing has not been as successful in 
exporting as call centers for customer relationship management. Therefore, the counterfactual 
                                                 
39 For example, this is the case of Carrier, which designs the installation of air-conditioning for certain venues, such 
as movie theaters, establishments, etc. That part of the design could be made remotely, from Mexico, reducing the 
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case for this study lies in specialized business process outsourcing, which in theory could benefit 
from the same location advantages as the call centers: a bilingual and skilled labor force as well 
as relatively low wages.     
None of the companies in this case study, either the first mover or followers, is currently 
undertaking specialized business process outsourcing. The main reason for this is that they only 
have the capacity and know-how to undertake customer service activities. Interestingly, there are 
some other companies in the IT sector that have entered this niche, yet even they state that it is 
underdeveloped. This is the case of Neoris, one of the most important information technology 
outsourcing companies in Latin America.  
 
6.1 Neoris  
Neoris is a company originated in Sentek, initially created by Cemex to outsource its own IT 
needs. Later, in 2000, in order to take advantage of the company’s expertise, it joined 12 Latin 
American companies and changed its name to Neoris.  In 2002 the company acquired 
Andersen’s Business Consulting group in Mexico. With revenues placing it among the top five 
IT service providers in Latin America, Neoris has 3,000 employees and offices in 13 locations, 
including the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Spain, Germany, and 
Portugal (AMR Research Report, 2004:15).  They have 180 clients around the world.  
Based on its IT services, Neoris has identified another niche in business process 
outsourcing services and has tried to diversify its portfolio of customers. The focus is on human 
resources because it is a critical service in every company. Neoris has undertaken functions such 
as processing payroll, following up worker inquiries, and other fiscal issues that can affect 
efficiency (Olguin).  
Yet, the main share of its income is still in IT services. Carlos Aguilar, Neoris’ 
outsourcing director, recognized that although the company perfectly envisions the market 
opportunities arising from the demand for these services, it has not been fully able to take 
advantage of this due a list of several factors. First, speaking about why other companies are not 
taking part in this niche, he highlighted that it could be due to a low level of entrepreneurial 
culture in Mexico that is willing to undertake the risks of entering new sectors. Second, he 
pointed out a lack of diffusion of government programs, such as PROSOFT in the software 
sector, for the different modalities of support for entering the specialized business process   95
outsourcing business. And finally, there is a limited infrastructure in English language education, 
which undermines the skills of the bilingual work force for these areas.  
 
6.2 Hewlett Packard 
Another company that has entered the specialized business process outsourcing sector is Hewlett 
Packard. The company announced in 2006 that it would outsource its administrative tasks, such 
as payroll, for the North American region to its Guadalajara, Mexico facilities, creating 1,000 
jobs. Yet that represents intra-firm trade.   
As these two short examples reveal, specialized business process outsourcing definitively 
represents a potential niche for Mexican exports. Yet some steps must be taken before firms will 
be able to fully exploit it.  
 
7)  Policy Recommendations 
 
The analysis of the emergence of call center service exports leads to a set of four venues for 
policy recommendations:  human capital formation; financial support; legal framework; and 
industrial policy. 
 
7.1. Bilingual Human Resources and Human Capital Formation 
Only six years have passed since the first exporting call center began operations, yet the sector is 
already experiencing some scarcity of bilingual human resources. Therefore, to remain an 
attractive location and prevent a general bilingual labor scarcity, the Mexican state needs to 
design and offer English courses at accessible prices, if not free, for those people not attending a 
university yet holding a high school education. They could become the workforce of customer 
service business process outsourcing. 
As for specialized business process outsourcing, a stronger effort is needed to make sure 
that people holding a bachelor degree have enough English skills to apply for this type of job. 
This could be an interesting opportunity for many unemployed or underemployed professionals 
in Mexico.   
 
7.2. Incentives 
In order to face international competition, it is important that the Mexican government develops 
a federal policy for call center/business process outsourcing incentives. Such a policy would   96
become an umbrella to coordinate state and local level policies. New incentives should also be 
designed to develop specialized business process outsourcing, particularly providing market 
insights to raise awareness of this niche and to a certain extent providing funds or mentoring to 
start up or upgrade businesses in this sector. 
 
7.3. Legal Framework 
Regarding the legal framework, Mexico’s fiscal reform has languished. The reform would allow 
the elimination of value-added tax in the call center sector, thus cutting operation costs. As this 
report has pointed out, the reform has already been taken to the chamber, where it failed. The 
elimination of the tax would definitely be a competitive advantage for Mexico vis-à-vis the rest 
of Latin America.  
 
7.4. Industrial Policy 
Mexico’s manufacturing industry is currently undergoing a transitional phase to services, but 
with the risk of repeating the mistake of becoming technologically and economically dependent. 
Therefore, if the country wants to successfully migrate from manufacture to mindfacture, an 
industrial policy that considers all branches of business process outsourcing, customer service, 
and specialization is crucial. This has to be in coordination with educational institutions to make 
sure that skilled labor is available.  
The government should also encourage the development of local providers in areas such 
as software services and high technology product designs that link to the business process 
outsourcing value chain. This would promote more local components in the industry.  Finally, 
attention should be paid to the development of the security, confidentiality, and quality norms of 
the business process outsourcing industry. This task would be promoted by the Ministries of 
Labor and Economy.  
Finally, the Mexican government should design a plan to promote Mexico’s competitive 
advantage abroad, to find more clients for the already established companies, and to bring into 
the country new international investors that encourage the development of exports from the call 
center and specialized business process outsourcing sector.  
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